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Very little research evidence exists with respect to the informal sector in African countries. 
Although (mixed) theoretical evidence does exist that postulates a relationship between 
formal sector employment and informal sector employment, very little is understood about 
the exact nature of such a relationship. The research problem to be answered by this study 
thus constitutes two parts: Firstly, to estimate the relationship between informal sector 
employment and formal sector employment in selected African countries, and, secondly, to 
compare and contrast the estimated coefficients for the sample of countries with respect to 
statistical significance, sign and magnitude of such estimated coefficients. 
 
The study makes use of a fixed effects or least squares dummy variable (LSDV) panel data 
regression model, in double-log form, that comprises observations for informal sector 
employment, formal sector employment and exports (as a possible proxy for the „trade cycle‟ 
effect on informal sector employment). The sample of countries includes: South Africa; 
Kenya; Namibia; Zambia; Botswana and Mauritius, for the study period, 1998 – 2008. 
 
Theoretically, the expectation is a negative relationship between informal sector employment 
and formal sector employment as these are (plausibly) „substitute‟ activities in the labour 
market. However, there is mixed evidence to support/negate this hypothesis. Further, the 
expectation is a positive relationship between informal sector employment and exports. 
 
Including formal sector employment and exports as explanatory variables in a linear 
regression framework, poses a possible problem of strong collinearity between the 
explanatory variables (i.e. multicollinearity) as formal sector employment and exports are, 




generally, strong positively correlated. This study uses suitable ratio transformation to 
remedy this problem. 
 
The general findings of the study are that South Africa, Namibia and Mauritius had 
statistically significant levels (or average changes therein) of informal employment as a 
proportion of population not dependent on changes to formal employment as a proportion of 
population and exports. In Namibia and Zambia, informal employment as a proportion of 
population was statistically related to formal employment as a proportion of population, with 
negative sign, and „elasticity‟ greater than 1. In Namibia and Mauritius, informal employment 
as a proportion of population was statistically related to exports. Namibia had a positive sign 
and „elasticity‟ barely in excess of 1. Mauritius, however, had a negative sign and „elasticity‟ 
greater than 1. 








1.1 Background to the Study 
 
Informal sector employment is plausibly a „substitute‟ activity for formal sector employment. 
Informal sector employment has seen remarkable growth in African countries and other 
developing countries during the past decades (Mulinge and Munyae, 1998). A number of 
African countries that have embraced economic restructuring that eventually led to decrease 
formal sector employment and increased informal sector employment (Konayuma, 2006). 
Although the significance of the informal sector varies across countries over time, society has 
become more-and-more aware of its importance. 
 
Generally-speaking, one would expect that rising (formal sector) employment leads to falling 
informal sector employment. Some labour economists hypothesise that wages, 
unemployment, and informal sector (employment) growth are positively correlated across 
countries (United Nations, 1995). Hussmanns (2004), on the other hand, stated that the 
informal economy had a significant contribution to; income generation and poverty reduction 
in many countries, especially in developing and transition economies.  
 
„Employment in the informal sector‟ and „informal employment‟ are labour market 
principles, which refer to various parts of the informalisation of employment. According to 
Hussmanns (2004), the concept of employment in the informal sector is defined in terms of 
characteristics, while the concept of informal employment is defined in terms of the 
characteristics of the job. Hussmanns (2001: 8), defines employment in the informal sector as 
a sum of, “all persons who, during a given reference period, were employed in at least one 




informal sector enterprise, irrespective of their status in employment and whether it was their 
main or a secondary job.” Informal employment comprises employment in the informal 
sector, “plus jobs of contributing family workers and informal jobs of employees in other 
sectors, plus the activities of persons engaged in the own-account production of goods for 
own final use by their household.” (Hussmanns, 2001: 8) 
 
Mbeki (2003) described the informal sector as the sector that is unable to generate the 
internal savings that would enable it to achieve the high rate of investment it needs and attain 
a rate of growth that would ultimately end its state of underdevelopment. The greater part of 
production units in the informal sector consists of subsistence-level activities and the reason 
why people join the informal sector is largely survivalist in nature. The informal sector is 
measured in terms of the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services that 
have contribution to Growth Domestic Product (GDP). However, these activities are not 
enshrined in legislation nor reported for use by government-type institutions (Reimer, 2003). 
According to Millin and Coetzee (2007), the informal sector is largely formed due to the 
coping behavior of individuals and families in an economic environment where (formal) 
earning opportunities are relatively scarce.  
 
Figure 1 shows the size of the informal sector as a percentage of Gross National Income 
(GNI), with South Africa at 28.4 percent, the continent‟s largest economy, versus 60 percent 















Source: Schneider (2002) 
 
According to Schneider (2002) the informal sector in sub-Saharan Africa was estimated to 
represent around three-quarters of non-agricultural employment, while the ILO (2002a) stated 
that the informal sector amounts to 72 percent of employment in sub-Saharan Africa; 78 
percent if South Africa is excluded. Chen (2001: 2) further stated that, “93 percent of new 
jobs created in Africa during the 1990s were in the informal sector, reflecting the impact of 
globalization, economic reforms and competitive pressures on the labour market in recent 
years.” 
 
Xaba, Horn and Motala (2002) summarised the empirical evidence for various African 
countries. This study showed that there has been a decline or stagnant employment growth in 
the formal sector, while the informal sector in Africa has been increasing with respect to both 
employment and output. For example, informal employment in Kenya is greater than 




employment in the formal sector (Schneider, 2002). The United Nations (1995, cited by 
Schneider, 2002) stated that informal sector employment in Africa is dominated by activities 
such as by trade-related, with services and manufacturing contributing to a small percentage 
of the sector.  
 
The informal sector represents a fundamental component of the economic structure of many 
developing, transition, and even developed countries. Gennari (2005) stated that informal 
sector activities are a key form of organisation of output and a vital source of employment 
and income opportunities, not only in rural, but also in urban areas. However, there is general 
consensus that the informal sector should be reduced in size or formalised in the long-run. 
Appendix A shows the size of the informal sector in selected African Countries. Growth of 
the informal sector is a key element of the prospect of all African nations for one reason: their 
present high unemployment rate will compress both local markets and foreign trade 
opportunities (Shinder, 1998). 
 
Read and Staines (2004) stated that the informal sector growth reflects no difficulty with 
which informal businesses can enter and grow within the economy. However, informal 
business entities will have a greater contribution to the economy if they can operate in the 
formal sector. Typically, the informal sector largely comprises economic activities not 
regulated by environmental laws, labour laws or taxation, but is subject to the regulations of 
the local authorities (i.e. local municipalities) for orderly business operation. Some examples 
of retail-based activities (which comprise the majority of the informal sector activity in 
African countries) are: market vendors; road-side stalls; shoe-shining; hawkers; home dress-
making; spaza shops; street vendors etc.. Nilima and Shiu (2006) stated that these activities 
are generally not added to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) calculation through business 




surveys but are usually covered in the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES). 
The above broad understanding of the informal sector has reference in this study. Further, 
data acquired via the HIES method will be used in order that a consistent approach to data 
collection be used in understanding cross-country econometrics analysis. 
 
According to the ILO (2002b), the worldwide informal sector has been growing fast (contrary 
to previous predictions), and a large number of jobs in recent years, predominantly in less-
developed and emerging market economies, has been in the informal sector. Alderson, 
Talmage and Freeman (2006) indicated that, in the case of Africa, informal employment is as 
high as 80 percent of the non-agricultural workforce and the informal sector has absorbed 
almost 90 percent of new jobs over the past two decades. Esim (2001: 3) said: 
 
“For instance, it accounts for more than half of non-agricultural employment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, nearly half in East Asia and as much as 80 percent in 
other parts of Asia and Africa. It is also responsible for 93 percent of new jobs in 
Africa and 83 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean.”  
 
For those countries where estimates exist, the informal sector accounts for 45 to 60 percent of 
non-agricultural GDP (Alderson et al., 2006). Gerxhani (2004, cited by Nilima and Shiu, 
2006: 5) found that, “the literature on developed countries argues more towards the positive 
effect, while in less developed countries, a negative relationship appears to be more 
dominant”. According to Pradhan and Van Soest (1995), the positive effect can be seen when 
informal sector earnings exceed unemployment income. Pradhan and Van Soest (1995) 
further said that, in equilibrium, a move from being unemployed to the informal sector 
involves a trade-off between earnings and reduced efficiency of job search. Verick (2001) 
said the negative effect of informal sector employment is seen by insufficient decent work 




opportunities compared to employment in the formal sector of the economy. Verick (2001: 7) 
further said that, “(informal) workers have lower levels of education and rates of literacy 
compared with the formal sector, reflecting that poor human capital increases the probability 
of participation in the informal sector.” 
 
The growth of informal sector employment as a result of to trade liberalisation is also 
possible. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) claimed that increased foreign competition in 
developing countries contributes to mushroom of the informal sector. According to Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2003), trade liberalisation represents “a removal of, or reduction in, the trade 
practices that thwart free flow of goods and services from one nation to another.” Integration 
into the world economy has established a solid means for countries to advance their economic 
growth, development, and poverty reduction (IMF, 2008). 
 
 Similarly, a high (formal sector) unemployment rate has an effect similar to that of an 
increased labour supply and some empirical results estimated by Walterskirchen (1999: 2) 
showed that: 
 
“There is a negative correlation between changes in employment and unemployment, 
but certainly not 1:1. This relation may be obscured by political and social factors; 
changes in active labour market policies alter the relationship between unemployment 
and employment substantially.” 
 
Therefore, an increase in formal employment does not imply a reduction in unemployment of 
the same amount – Walterskirchen (1999: 6) supports this by stating that, “in Australia, out of 
three additional jobs only one has been occupied by an unemployed person, the remainder by 
persons from outside the labour market: hidden domestic labour reserves and in particular 




additional foreign workers.” Alternatively, additional formal sector jobs will be occupied 
partly by registered unemployed, partly by informally employed or other parts of the labour 
force (as above). 
 
Okun‟s law demonstrates that there is a correlation between unemployment rates and 
deviations between actual and potential GDP (Walterskirchen, 1999). A high unemployment 
rate has an effect similar to an increase in labour supply; higher unemployment happened to 
increase the employment intensity growth, as it puts pressure on businesses to raise 
employment, particularly in low-wage occupations. Walterskirchen (1999) stated that the 
higher the Okun coefficient, that is, the higher the responsiveness of job loss to GDP growth, 
the better the chances for reducing unemployment through growth and demand-side policies.  
 
Furthermore, the informal sector‟s growth (or decline) has essentially been linked to the 
decline (or growth) of the formal sector economy. According to Becker (2004), inadequate 
ability of the formal economy to soak up excess labour, together with a growing number of 
job-seekers, has increased the size of informal sector employment. 
 
Table 1: Contribution of the Informal Economy to Employment 




Non-Agricultural Employment 78% 57% 45-85% 
Urban Employment 61% 40% 40-60% 
New Jobs 93% 83% N/A 
 
Source: Becker (2004) 
 




The informal sector is continuously growing. The estimates show that informal employments‟ 
share of new jobs is 93 percent in Africa and 83 percent in Latin America. The informal 
sector contributes significantly to employment generation and output growth of Africa and 
Latin America.  
 
1.2   Research Problem 
 
Very little research evidence exists with respect to the informal sector in African countries.  
Although (mixed) theoretical evidence does exist that postulates a relationship between 
formal sector employment and informal sector employment, very little is understood about 
the exact nature of such a relationship.  The research problem to be answered by this study 
thus constitutes two parts:  Firstly, to estimate the relationship between formal sector 
employment and informal sector employment in selected African countries, and, secondly, to 
compare and contrast the estimated coefficients for the sample of countries with respect to 
statistical significance, sign and magnitude of such estimated coefficients. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
1) To discuss various perspectives of informal sector development. 
2) To construct a summary framework for the major findings of the various perspectives of 
informal sector development. 
3) To establish the (theoretical) linkages between formal sector employment, informal sector 
employment and exports (i.e. using exports as a possible proxy for the „trade cycle‟ effect 
on informal sector employment).  
4) To estimate the relationship between formal sector employment and informal sector 
employment in selected African countries using a fixed effects panel data approach.   
 




1.4 Research Methodology 
 
The study makes use of a fixed effects or least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) panel data 
regression model that comprises observations for informal sector employment, formal sector 
employment and exports (as a possible proxy for the „trade cycle‟ effect on informal sector 
employment). The panel data approach consists of observations characterised by both cross-
sectional (i.e. between various countries) and time series dimensions (i.e. over time). The 
study will make use of published (secondary) data compiled from a range of statistical 
sources. Further, data acquired via the household income and expenditure survey (HIES) 
method will be used in order that a consistent approach to data collection be used in 
understanding cross-country econometrics analysis. 
 
The samples of African countries selected are: South Africa; Kenya; Zambia; Namibia; 
Botswana and Mauritius. Data for each country on the preceding three variables is available 
for the period 1998-2008, making a sample size of 66 observations.  The econometric 
methodology, incorporating the estimation of various panel data regression models, will, 
ostensibly, use a fixed effects or least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach to 
estimation. A number of possible models will, therefore, be estimated: 
1) The intercept and slope coefficient/s are constant over time and across countries. 
2) The slope coefficient/s is/are constant; intercept varies across countries. 
3) The slope coefficient/s is/are constant; intercept varies across countries and over time. 









1.5 Thesis Organisation 
 
The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter two focuses on the theoretical approach to 
informal sector employment growth. Chapter three establishes the (theoretical) link between 
informal sector employment, formal sector employment and trade liberalisation. Chapter four 
outlines the theoretical model specification to be used and econometric analysis of the six 
selected African countries. Chapter five concludes the study by summarising key findings.   
 
1.6 Limitations of the Study 
 
It is acknowledged that there is no established guideline for the compilation and/or collection 
of statistics on the informal sector economy. A preliminary literature review of the subject 
reveals that various methods of data collection and definitions of the informal sector 
economy have been used by different authors which make the comparison of findings 
difficult. Schneider and Enste (2000), for example, discussed a range of methods: sample 
survey method; fiscal audit method; national income and expenditure method; official versus 
actual labour force approach; transactions approach; currency demand approach and the 
physical input method. However, possible size of the informal sector economy can 
nonetheless be measured and the information carefully used by policy-makers. 
 
The obtainable data sources do not all the time give the information that the definition asks 
for. Consequently, available facts about the informal sector trend and composition for the 
country lack a common meaning and consistency over time. Most countries use labour force 
surveys to gauge the size of informal sector employment. It is also argued, that when a labour 
force survey is carry out to calculate approximately the informal sector employment, it tends 
to miss-out certain categories of single-person/own-account enterprises, because it is not easy 




to categorise such workers as enterprises. Further, available data sources sometimes are 
reduced to different definition and consistency in data collection over time. 
 
 
The choice of the six African countries is based on availability, consistent time series data for 
all six countries. These country at some point share same trade union such as COMESA, and 
they all equally have trade relationship with America on which their exports are measured in 
US Dollars ($). Therefore, a balanced panel is obtained and all are sub-Saharan African 
countries (except Mauritius being as Island economy, but part of SADC). According to 
Gyimah-Brempong (1991: 816), “all sub-Saharan African countries have similar economic 
structures: low per capita income; largely agrarian economies with very small industrial 
sectors; relatively low growth rate; and a strictly binding foreign exchange constraint.” This 
makes cross-country comparison much easier. 
 
 Incorporation of exports instead of net exports is due to the fact that there is hardly any 
country (selected) that has a positive net exports for the period. Gyimah-Brempong (1991: 
816) stated that, “because of the relative homogeneity of economic structure, weak economic 
policy-making apparatus, and a shared legacy of colonial economies, responses to instability 
in export earnings are likely to be similar among nations of sub-Saharan African countries.” 
These similarities of selected African countries resulted into a negative net export, hence the 





















2.1     Introduction 
 
Macroeconomics has taken the challenge of explaining informal sector development, as 
evidenced by the large number of books and articles that have been published on the topic. 
Chen (2007) has identified informal sector as having the potential to play an important role 
both in providing employment and in contributing to the reorientation of the economy. 
Literature on the informal sector uses different approaches to explain informal sector 
development, ranging from simplistic explanations to more philosophically, complex 
explanation such as the dualist, structuralist, legalist, continuum (Becker, 2004),  micro-
business enterprises (Rakowski, 1994), and Todaro-Lewis model (Nolen, 2007) 
approaches/perspectives. Chapter two attempts to explain the separation between the informal 
sector and formal sector economies. 
 
2.2     The Dualist Approach 
 
The dualist approach explains the informal sector as a set of subsidiary activities that provide 
incomes for the deprived; those who are incapable (for various reason) of accessing 
employment in the formal sector (Reimer, 2003). According to Gorden (1982: 188) informal 
sector growth, “is due to the fact that not enough modern job opportunities have been created 
to absorb surplus labour, due to a slow rate of economic growth and/or a faster rate of 
population growth.” The formal sector dominates the key industrial sector, capturing rapidly 
expanding markets and initiating innovative technological changes. As the economy grows, 
                                                 
1
 Development in the context of this study largely implies growth in employment and output but also (to some 
extent) an improvement in the quality of employment conditions, and output over time. 




the formal sector economy becomes increasingly differentiated from the informal sector 
economy that remains on the periphery. African countries are characterised by more than one 
„labour market‟ with huge differences between one market and another (Chen, 2007). The 
labour market is the market in which people battle for occupations and employers compete 
for the available workforce. There are various ways of thinking about these two markets: 
informal-formal markets. The formal sector is deemed superior to the informal sector and 
these two types of sectors result in economic dualism that comprises informal sector 
employment and formal sector employment (Gorden, 1982). 
 
2.2.1     The Dual Labour Market 
 
The dual labour market assumes two sectors with two different labour markets: formal and 
informal. In the formal sector workers enjoy higher earnings, better employment security and 
often the protection of unions. The informal sector represents a totally opposite situation 
comprising a large portion of the unemployed; black women being the major participants in 
the informal sector (Saint-Paul, 1996).  
 
In contrast to the supply-side and individual factors which dominate the neoclassical model 
of the labour market, segmentation theory emphasises demand-side and organisational 
features. Segmentation in the employment market arises because of various job attributes 
rather than differences in worker features, such as education and training (Saracoglu, 2005). 
Informal employment is largely filled by groups whose attachment to formal employment has 
been weak. Labour market segmentation differs in quality of jobs, and admission to the sector 
with good jobs is limited in the sense that not all who want employment in this segment are 
able to be employed there (Learning Space, 2008). Such job rationing is an essential part of 
the idea of labour market segmentation.  




Until the early 1970s, developing countries were regularly characterised by dual economies, 
with a traditional agricultural sector and a more modern urban sector (Saracoglu, 2005). The 
issue of dualism has concentrated on the labour market (e.g. informal sector employment and 
formal sector employment). There are factors that characterise the informal sector of the less-
developed countries, and Schneider and Enste (2000) cite them as:  
1) Formal sector unemployment - there is no welfare net to catch the unemployed who thus 
have to become involuntarily employed and eventually join informal sector employment 
to survive.  
2) Complicated/restrictive rules and regulations - these include labour legislation that may 
prevent more employment in the formal sector; registration cost of a business that forces 
it into the informal sector. 
3) Decline of „civic vetoes‟- informal sector businesses take care of themselves with no 
perceived benefit of formalising the business.  
4) Rise in taxation in the formal sector - forces those formal sector businesses that are 
making very small profit into the informal sector as rising costs tip average cost above 
average revenue. 
 
All these factors can shape the size of the informal sector. Factors two and four above capture 
the extra cost argument. Employees and employers leave the formal sector to join the 
informal sector due to reduced work opportunities or profit in the formal sector economy. 
Further extensions to the dualistic model have evolved, taking into account factors such as 
job search costs, level of education, discrimination in the hiring process and allowance for an 
urban informal sector (Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
 




Another characteristic of the dual labour market is the operation of an „internal‟ labour 
market in the formal sector, meaning that many job positions are not filled by posting 
vacancies in the market but rather by internal promotion, while the „external/outside‟ market 
is the source of recruitment to the informal sector (Saint-Paul, 1996). The informal sector 
labour market is thought of as providing flexibility to the economy. The workforce in the 
informal sector is used to adjust to fluctuations in labour demand, including fluctuations 
induced by regular economic changes (business cycle) as shown in Figure 2. For instance, a 
firm might use a core formal sector workforce along with informal sector workers who may 
be fired during times of economic downturn. 
 








  Secondary Workers 
  
                                   Primary Workers 
         
                                                                                                                                      Time 
 
Source: Saint-Paul (1996) 
 
Firms prefer to hire a „primary‟ workforce paying efficient wages, provided these firms do 
not expect to change employment too often. Saint-Paul (1996) explains the primary 
workforce as that part of the labour market that tends to offer high salaries or wages, better 




working conditions, and grater job stability. Firms are more likely to utilise a „secondary‟ 
workforce when greater demand fluctuations are expected. The secondary workforce 
comprises occupations that tend to pay lower wages, have insecure employment, and provide 
less opportunity for advancement.  The secondary workforce allows firms to employ a 
„primary‟ workforce, but avoid paying the costs associated with efficiency wages. Hence, 
dualism arises „endogenously‟ (i.e. having no clear external cause) within firms as a response 
to demand fluctuation and, under plausible conditions, reducing these fluctuations, reduces 
the share of secondary workers (Saint-Paul, 1996).  
 
 In most parts of the world, there has been a trend away from core workers towards atypical 
workers (Freiji, 2002). In South Africa, the move towards temporary or casual labour has 
been quite widespread and a total of 85.5 percent of enterprises in a recent survey (such as 
labour force survey 2007) had employed temporary or casual labour (Barker, 2007). 
Examples of such firms are restaurants and construction organisations. Barker (2007) further 
explains the informal sector as being separate from the formal sector; the informal sector is 
distinguished on the basis of various characteristics such as family ownership, skills that are 
















2.2.2     Training 
 
The two markets (formal and informal) are not defined according to occupation or industry 
but rather by a set of general features. As stated in Learning Space (2008), the primary and 
secondary sectors of the labour market are the result of the interaction between these two 
main groups. The labour pool to fill jobs in the informal sector is relatively undifferentiated; 
close to a standardised mass of „raw‟ labour power (Learning Space, 2008). This means that 
there is little or no on-the-job training necessary to perform these jobs and if training is 
provided, it is general in nature.  
 
The inability of the informal sector to establish markets for their products is due to a lack of 
business skills (Ormond, 1994). A number of poorly developed skills such as financial record 
keeping, product quality control and marketing, were identified, all of which could be 
corrected through training. Informal sector operators often have technological skills, but lack 
the necessary management skills to successfully operate the business, therefore, failing to 
meet the formal sector standard of operation. Similarly, informal sector managers seldom 
plan or train employees, hence business failure is a result of management failure. Gamble 
(2004, cited by Mlambo-Ngcuka, Wadula, Botha, and Gamble, 2004: 41) said “research that 
was conducted mostly in African countries shows that the conventional track followed by 
those who achieve success in sustainable entrepreneurial self-employment is one that starts 
with completion of general education, followed by further formal or informal vocational or 
special training.” The stark reality for most people in the informal sector all over the world is 
that entrants frequently have to leave school before the end of the compulsory school period 
(or no schooling at all) and thus receive limited general education. 
 




The informal sector managers also lack an understanding of the benefit to be had from 
training and further have very modest expectations of the benefit to be gained from any kind 
of management development. The management incompetence and lack of experience were 
the major reasons for informal sector failure (Nattrass and Glass, 1986). The owner/manager 
of informal enterprises does not identify, or respond quickly enough to, the external 
environment and ultimately the business fails. Business operations between the formal and 
informal sectors differ in various activities, and Ormond (1994: 26) cited four major reasons 
that distinguish business operations in the formal versus informal sectors: 
1) Lack of fundamental ability to plan, organise and manage the operation. The failure of             
informal business starts with lack of planning and follow-through. Failure is still possible 
if the plans are not revised to take into account contingencies of the operation. Without 
follow-through, plans are valueless. 
2) The lack of balance in business ability (know-how) with either too much or too little 
formal training relative to experience. 
3) Lack of experience in the practices of a particular line of business. 
4) The lack of everyday on the job experience in applying management principles. This is 
called the information gap.  
 
Therefore, what type of workforce is most likely to work in the informal sector? Most studies 
acknowledge a similar composition of workforce, and Freiji (2002) elaborated by saying 
individuals with a smaller amount of skills of and education, are more likely to enrol in 








2.3     The Structuralist Approach 
 
The structuralist approach explains the informal sector as a set of subordinated sector units 
and workers that serve to decrease the input and labour costs for the large formal enterprises, 
and thereby, increase the competitiveness of formal enterprises. Productivity gains in the 
formal sector are in part, reliant on an enlargement in the informal enterprises. The nature of 
formal sector development accounts for the persistent growth of informal production 
interactions.  
 
According to this school of thought, the nature of industrial progress (rather than a lack of 
formal sector growth) accounts for the persistence and development of informal production 
interaction. Castells and Portes (1989) subscribe to the idea that the informal sector ought to 
be viewed as subordinate economic units and employees that provide to shrink input and 
labour costs, increase the competitiveness of large capitalist firms. According to Chen (2007), 
retrenched workers often move into informal sector employment when formal businesses are 
closed or the public sector is rationalised. Jose (2008: 4) defines the informal sector as 
broadly characterised of “units engaged in the production of goods or services with primary 
objective of generating employment and income to the persons concerned.”  It is important 
not to pronounce any judgement on whether such informal sector activities are good or bad 
for the economy. Gli (2004: 1) stated that: 
 
“The debt crisis of the underdeveloped countries, the dismantling of the public sector, 
the deregulation of the labour market under the structural adjustment programs of the 
IMF and the World Bank, and the succession of economic and financial crises in 
1997, has pushed millions of people in Africa, Asia and Latin America out of formal 
employment and into the informal economy.” 




People are generally not in informal sector employment by choice, but as a means to survive. 
Currently, development of informal employment is related to several structural changes in the 
dominant economy such as new immigrant labour - market entrants to a pool of workers 
already swollen by technological changes (Davies, 2002). 
 
2.3.1     Trade Liberalisation 
 
According to Maiti and Marjit (2007), globalisation through trade, foreign direct investment 
(FDI), capital, technological know-how and resettlement can fuel demand and output, give 
rise to privileged income and job formation (in both formal and informal sectors), thereby 
decreasing poverty. From the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the main outcome of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model of trade, has presented a hypothetical (economic) structure to 
clarify how trade impacts employment and earnings. The essential hypothesis is that trade 
openness stimulates an enlargement in demand for labour-intensive exportable goods 
produced in less-developed countries. In most developing countries unskilled labour is in 
abundance, and trade openness is likely to contribute positively to informal sector 
employment creation (Maiti and Marjit, 2007).   
 
Employment growth in export-oriented firms relies on the flexibility of demand for labour in 
the informal sector, which, in turn, is provisional on the labour supply elasticity (Verick, 
2006). The effect of trade and other forms of globalisation on employment depends on how 
the labour market operates. A hypothetical model of small open-market economies with two 
factors: labour and capital, and three types of goods: exportable, importable and non-tradable, 
gives a different prediction for the impact of trade on employment and wage (Hasan, 2001). 
A more relevant prediction for the impact of trade on informal employment can be proposed, 
and Verick (2006: 11) explains by saying: 




“Prior to liberalisation, import-competing capital-intensive industries in developing 
countries typically operated in the formal (private and public) sector. After reducing 
barriers to trade, we would expect, therefore, that there is a fall in demand for goods 
produced in the formal sector, resulting in a drop in employment in this sector in the 
short and long-run. Employment in the exportable sector is predicted to increase in 
any case, while the effect on wages in this sector depends on the assumption 
regarding wage rigidities.” 
 
The development of the informal sector pivots on whether this sector specialises in the 
manufacturing of tradeable or non-tradeable goods. The presumption is that informal 
businesses produce exportable goods; then the demand for these goods would also hike after 
trade openness, leading to development of informal sector employment (Verick, 2006). 
However, Maiti and Marjit (2007) argue that the informal sector has in fact two roles in a 
globalised economy: firstly, as a provider of intermediate goods to the formal sector; and 
secondly, as manufacturer of final goods. Increased production in the informal sector permits 
the firms to take advantage of a growing export market. As a result of an expansion in the 
export market, segmentation of labour emerges and specialisation takes place during the 













2.3.2     Unemployment 
 
Not all labour units are employed all the time. All global economies experience some kind of 
unemployment whether structural, cyclical or frictional. Laws mandating a high minimum 
wage in the formal sector, contribute to increased unemployment amongst the unskilled and 
less-experienced members of the labour force.  One of the reasons for unemployment is wage 
rigidity - the failure of wage to adjust until the quantity of labour supplied equals‟ quantity of 
labour demanded (Mankiw, 2003). When the real wage is more than the level that 
equilibrates supply and demand, the quantity of labour supplied is greater than the quantity of 
labour demanded. Real wage rigidity decreases the level of job acquisition in the formal 
sector. The rate of unemployment rises and unemployed workers now search for informal 
sector employment as a matter of survival. People are jobless not because they are 
aggressively looking for employment that best matches their individual skills, but because, at 

















Figure 3: Real Wage Rigidity Leads to Job Rationing 
  
Source: Mankiw (2003) 
Note: W1 = Rigid real wage; L1 = Amount of labour hired; L2 = Amount of labour willing to work 
 
Labour economists have used the notion of compensating differential (additional income 
given to an employee who is working undesirable job, relative to other jobs) to hypothesise 
that (higher) wages and unemployment, and unemployment and informal sector growth are 
positively correlated across space (United Nations, 1995). Furthermore, the privatisation of 
state-owned businesses have consequently lead to job losses, while trade liberalisation has the 
resulted in reduction and shutting-down of some formal businesses which were not able to 
compete given the accessibility of relatively cheaper imports (Barker, 2007).  The growth in 
the unemployment rate is indicative of rising job losses. Unemployment occurs as a result of 
skills or regional mismatches arising from workers whose skills have become technologically 
redundant and/or lower demand for specific labour skills in a region. As a result, many 
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skilled workers are pushed into taking relatively inferior jobs in the informal sector. 
Unemployment is further attributed to various causes such as frictional effects, seasonal 
changes, technology, business cycle fluctuations and structural barriers. 
 
The unemployment rate is the most broadly used gauge of the state of an economy. Changes 
in unemployment and proportion of employment in formal and informal sectors explain most 
of the changes in inequality, whereas changes in wage dispersion in formal and informal 
sectors, explain less of the changes in inequality (Kingdon and Knight, 2000).  
 
2.3.3     Skill-Biased Technological Progress 
 
In African countries, increased capital intensity as a structural change in big firms has 
contributed to an increase in unemployment and underemployment (Pianta and Vivarelli, 
2000). A popular explanation for the unemployment problem is that the opportunities for 
less-skilled workers have been declining relative to those for more highly-skilled workers. 
The inability to compete with low-wage labour in developed countries (DCs) and technical 
progress that is biased against unskilled workers, have both been identified as reasons for a 
shift in demand away from less-skilled workers (Shi, 1999).                                                                                                                                  
 
The significant sectoral increase in unemployment, nonparticipation and non-employment are 
heavily concentrated amongst less-skilled individuals. These increases are the result of 
reduced demand for unskilled workers. According to Juhn (1991, cited by Archibald, 2002: 
40), “the evidence suggests that non-neutral changes in the long-run demand for labour, 
coupled with wages that are flexible in the long-run may be the major factors explaining 
changing jobless rates.” Labour market regulation is not the fundamental cause of labour 
market problems, but does determine the form these problems take (Gindling and Terrell, 




2002). Countries like South Africa, which have institutions or measures in place (i.e. such as 
a welfare grant, minimum wages and trade unions), aim to prevent increased inequality in 
income distribution, but will hinder adjustment in relative wages and exacerbate high 
unemployment, particularly amongst unskilled individuals. 
 
Archibald (2002: 42) stated that, “new technology could only lead to permanently high 
unemployment in the improbable and more likely impossible event that all consumer desires 
have been fully satisfied and demand could not increase to match an increase in productive 
capacity.” New technology may cause unemployment to rise in certain occupations or 
regions. Technology does tend to destroy lower wage, lower productivity jobs and create 
more productive, high-skilled and better-paid jobs. The transition to new technology can lead 
to a disparity between the skills people possess and those that are required.  
 
Lags between the redundancy of old jobs and the creation of new ones may also exist, when 
the economic growth rate of a region or countries slow down. Firms in the formal sector tend 
to shrink by laying-off employees in order to cut down their operating cost (Kingdon and 
Knight, 2005). Retrenched workers then seek alternative sources of income, which mostly 
turn out to be informal employment. The faster productivity grows, the lesser formal sector 
jobs created by a given rate of economic growth. Ishengoma and Kappel (2006: 10) explain 
that, “an increase in the economic growth rate of a country does not automatically result in 
the movement of workers from the IS to the formal sector.” The demand for labour relies 









2.4     The Legalist Approach 
 
The most common technique of distinguishing between the informal sector and the formal 
sector considers the nature of technology used and whether business activity escape 
regulation. de Soto (2000) subscribes to the belief that the informal sector consists of 
„plucky‟ small business innovator who decide to labour informally with an intention to evade 
the expenses, time and process of formal registration. According to de Soto (2000), micro-
entrepreneurs will carry on to operate informally so long as administration regulations are 
weighty and costly. Pratap and Quintin (2006) find that the levy burden, weak rule-of-law, 
government corruption, significant bureaucracy related to registration, poorly protected 
property rights and the inefficiency of the legal system are important factors explaining 
disparity in the size of the informal economy in countries with comparable levels of 
economic development.  
 
Economists have established a relationship between tax rates, tax evasion and the size of the 
informal economy. A striking feature of the informal sector in developing countries is that 
production of goods and services is legal, but is largely unregulated (Becker, 2004). As 
opposed to regulating the informal sector, authorities tend to adopt a non-interventionist 
attitude as they are aware that the informal sector provides a means of survival for poor 
people. In addition, informal economic activities are not fundamentally carried out by way of 
calculated objective to escaping expenses of taxes, social security contributions, or infringing 









2.4.1    Tax Evasion 
 
Tax avoidance is the characteristic of the informal sector that has encouraged the most 
debate. Andreoni, Brain and Feinstein (1989) see significant links between the economics of 
tax conformity and public finance; regulation enforcement; organisational design; labour 
supply. Gerxhani (1999) stated that there are two clusters reasons that contributed to the 
informal sector activities, thus; the „structural‟ and „opportunity‟ factors. The structural factor 
consists of fiscal pressure, socio-psychological pressure and institutional limitations. The 
opportunity factor consists of individual surroundings such as skills, schooling, contacts and 
living situation, ethics and principles, and environmental factors.  
 
Gerxhani (1999: 10) said, “the individual free choice affects the decision on tax payments 
based on a combination of inadequate information and a lack of any trust in the way taxes are 
spent.” The evasion of tax is mainly caused by high tax especially on small business. The 
Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR) analysis in Table 2 shows that small businesses face a 
higher METR than large firms. The fact is that many small businesses do not register for 
VAT and hence cannot claim input tax credits. The small business thus, in all sectors, may 
face high METR (Small Business Tax regime) compared to large firms, in any sector, with or 









Table 2: Summary of Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR) for the Standard and Small 
Business Tax Regimes by Country, 2005 
 
Source: Stern and Barbour (2005) 
 
The objective for taxation of small business is to raise revenue for the government budget. 
The tax burden is another factor that deters informal sector firms from joining the formal 
sector mostly due to the compliance costs of monitoring rather than the financial obligation, 
thus some firms choose to operate informally primarily to avoid tax. Visser (2004, cited by 
Mlambo-Ngcuka et al., 2004) realised the need to review the administrative tax burden faced 
by SMMEs. 
 
The informal sector operates in, and mediates between, state and private spheres, system of 
government and marketplace, lawful and unlawful, and essential and marginal levels. Wedel 
(2003:29) said, “the informal entrepreneurs take advantage of economic opportunities by 
enabling themselves to survive and even thrive in an environment of uncertainty.” The state 
bureaucrats make it possible for private organisations to appropriate public property for 





Country/Sector Manufacturing Tourism Agriculture Financial Mining 
Not Vat 
Registered 
Zambia 0%-10% 0%-10% 10% 25%-25% 0% 20%-25% 
South Africa 27% 28% 23% 31% 10% 22%-32% 
Rwanda 29% 14% 7% 38% 15% 34%-51% 




themselves through political bribery (Heintz and Pollin, 2008). The decision to evade taxes 
can also affect occupational choices, investment in human capital, and labour supply. 
 
Figure 4 shows that most operators in the informal sector would not be willing to accept 
formal employment if given a choice because they perceive their business endeavor to be a 
permanent career path.  
 













Source: Ligthelm and Lamb (2004) 
 
Wedel (2003: 35) explains, “even when members appear to work primarily in business or 
private organisations, the group‟s economic strength and influence may derive significantly 
from its ability to participate in the state sector and simultaneously access its advantages for 
the survival of their business.” The informal sector will continue to operate informally as 
long as government rules and regulations are stifling private enterprise. Wedel (2003: 34) 
said, “the state officials have used their positions to further private interest in the informal 



























and that rely on the coercive power of the state administration.” Hence, the legislative 
approach postulates that certain rules and regulations hamper private enterprise in the formal 
sector economy, and possibly make it more profitable for private enterprise to operate in the 
informal sector economy, thereby providing an incentive for the informal sector to thrive and 
grow. 
 
2.5      The Continuum Approach 
 
According to Barker (2003: 97), “this approach refers to the economy as a whole seen as a 
continuum of activities from stable, full-time wages employment on one hand to informal 
self-employed persons on the other hand, and with a number of variants in between.”  At the 
formal end of the continuum, there is a relatively complete range of social protection against 
a wide range of contingencies, while towards the informal end of the continuum, the 
likelihood is that the bulk of economically active women in less-developed countries are 
engaged in informal sector employment (Lund and Srinivas, 2000). Chen (2007: 2) found 
that, “economic relations – of production, distribution and employment – tend to fall at some 
point on a continuum between pure „formal‟ relations (i.e. regulated and protected) at one 
pole and pure „informal‟ relations (i.e. unregulated and unprotected) at the other, with many 
categories in between.”  
 
The formal and the informal ends of the economic continuum are often dynamically linked 
(Lund and Srinivas, 2000). For instance, numerous informal businesses conduct production or 
distribution relationships with formal sector businesses, providing input, finished goods or 
services either through direct transaction or subcontract arrangement. Cabagarajah, Niels-
Hugo and Raju (2001) said that the relationship between the formal and informal sectors can 




often be relatively „solid and wide‟ (i.e. movement of workers between formal and informal 
work), predominantly in urban areas, across countries. 
 
The term „informal sector‟ simply refers to economic activities at the base end of a 
continuum of business activities. According to Hussmanns (2004), the informal sector is used 
as a convenience, since the „informal‟ conjures up an image of less-stable, more oppressed 
and fragile, and sometimes impermanent economic activities and these represent the focus of 
the activities which are central to this work. 
 
2.5.1 Linkage Between Informal and Formal Sector Economies 
 
The continuum approach is characterised by the acknowledgment of the dependence of 
informal sector employment on formal sector employment. This dependency could be either 
harmonising (e.g. via sub-contracting activities) or unviable (e.g. unregistered business 
activities because labour is cheaper and operational costs are lower). The dependency is 
shown in Table 3 where the informal sector in South Africa is gradually more recognised by 
manufacturers and wholesalers as a key distribution channel of goods to consumers (Ligthelm 













Table 3: Type of Support Received From Formal Sector Suppliers 
 
Source: Ligthelm and Lamb (2004) 
 
The type of support received by informal township retailers from formal sector suppliers is 
that approximately ninety percent of informal retailers received deliveries of merchandise 
from suppliers. Township general dealers seem to be more established than spaza shops or 
hawkers. Although manufacturers and wholesalers support the informal sector, the level of 
credit offered is still low and this makes it harder for the informal sector to grow. Therefore, 
access to credit is a major factor that needs to be remedied if the informal sector is to become 
a sustainable entity. 
 
The linkage which exists between the informal and formal sectors, hinges on two questions: 
Firstly, are the linkages of a benign or exploitative nature, and secondly, is the lower end of 
the economic continuum capable of responding to promotions policies or is it not – is it 
evolutionary or not (Dewar and Watson, 1989)? The debate has revolved around the question 
of how capital accumulation takes place in the informal sector. Dewar and Watson (1989:4) 
said: 
 





General Dealers in 
Township (%) 
Deliveries 87.9 86.7 89.6 
Promotion materials 60.8 21.1 53.7 
Name on signboard 48.6 4.4 62.7 
Shop equipment 32.1 16.7 43.3 
Discount price 19.0 17.8 34.3 
Credit 8.6 0.0 13.4 




 “It is argued that these activities do generate surplus unless unduly suppressed by 
law, in this case it is assumed that the linkages are benign. On the other hand, it has 
been argued that the informal sector is incapable of accumulation because its level of 
surplus is dictated by the accumulation process in the formal sector, thus linkages are 
exploitative”. 
 
The informal sector plays a role in the flow of goods and services by being situated near 
consumers, by providing credit to consumers, by selling in units as requested, and by 
targeting products specifically to the needs of the low-income market. The informal sector, 
therefore, generally serves a specifically poor market, and in this sense remains 
complementary to the formal sector.  
 
The relationship between the formal and the informal sectors generally has, as a point of 
departure, the theory of unequal exchange as being a fundamental explanation of regional 
inequality (Dewar and Watson, 1989). Chen (2007: 9) said, “also, many formal firms in 
developed countries have decided to sub-contract production to workers in developing 
countries: some of whom are relatively protected (e.g. those who work in call centres) while 
others are not protected (e.g. many of those who work in assembly factories).” The 
relationship between the formal and the informal sector is largely explained by an economic 
surplus which is generated in the informal sector and is then transferred to the formal sector.  
 
There are two major mechanisms through which a surplus may be transferred from the 
informal sector to the formal sector, and, hence, inhibits informal sector growth: Firstly, the 
informal sector lacks access to the basic resources of production because these resources are 
monopolised by the formal sector. Dewar and Watson (1989: 6) said: 




“The oligopolistic organisation of the product markets leaves for informal activities 
those segments of the economy where minimum size or stability conditions are not 
attractive for oligopolistic forms to ensure the realisation of economies of scale and to 
guarantee an adequate utilisation”. 
 
Secondly, the informal sector is forced into a position whereby it must pay higher prices for 
its purchases, whether for production or resale, and have smaller margins on its output; any 
surplus being harvested by the formal sector. Prices are usually high because small operators 
can only purchase small quantity, and do not have access to credit services, while prices for 
their goods are lower because of the consumer markets they depend upon (Dewar and 
Watson, 1989). The ability of the informal sector to grow or respond to „promotional 
policies‟ (i.e. formalisation of the informal sector) is limited and the sector as a whole is said 
to be „involuting'. Involuting in this context means that when the formal sector thrives, the 
informal sector remains on the periphery and does not develop. 
 
However, the distinction between informal and formal businesses arises because of higher 
relative operating costs in the formal business structure, such as wages, administrative and 
transaction costs (Gray, Cooley and Lutabingwa, 1997). As demand grows, specialisation in 
the manufacture method becomes more deepened to match dynamic consumer demand. 
Micro-businesses in rural or secluded areas encounter information gaps regarding markets 
and technology (Ishengoma and Kappel, 2008). Thus, to close these gaps, formal businesses 
have to develop a strategy to gather information in exchange for a part of the profits. As the 
size of the market increases, the degree of operation has to increase, necessitating investment 
in capacity building. Small local entrepreneurs are however far more capital constrained than 
larger businesses and traders.  
 




2.6    The Micro-Business Enterprises Approach 
 
The theoretical link between business constraints and the growth potential or performance of 
Small Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) can be viewed from different points-of-view. 
According to Ishengoma and Kappel (2008), business constraints (limited access to finance, 
high taxes, and lack of market access) may, on one hand, limit physical capital accumulation, 
while on the other hand, constrain a firm‟s ability to undertake its daily operations by 
reducing the capacity to  make business decisions.  Bigsten and Soderbon (2005) further said 
that the modern African manufacturing sector is small and stagnant; there is little investment; 
and does not compete in the export market. 
 
Many economists attribute comparatively small size of many businesses in developing 
countries to the insufficiency of capital and administrative experience (Gray et al., 1997). 
However, through the informal sector, the less-skilled rural labour force obtains skills 
essential for survival in the more challenging urban environment (UNIDO, 2008). The 
informal sector also „sponges‟ skilled persons retrenched from formal sector jobs, but the 
informal sector is viewed as a second-best option for those incapable of finding and keeping 
jobs in the formal sector (Kimuyu, 1999).  
 
Micro enterprises can successfully create employment, innovation, returns and growth. 
However, small businesses generally do not achieve their full potential because they are 
hampered by restricted market access, finances, technology and various operational skills 
(Ishengoma and Kappel, 2008). The formalisation of businesses in many less-developed 
countries is impeded by bureaucratic policies, which usually bring longer delays, higher costs 
of public services, greater corruption and less investment (Becker, 2004). 
 




2.6.1    Limited Labour Absorption 
 
A low rate of labour absorption in the formal sector is a more complex problem than merely 
the adoption of a relatively capital-intensive structure of production induced by underpricing 
capital and overpricing labour. Geithman and Landers (1973) stated that among today‟s less-
developed countries (LDCs) even high growth rates can, and frequently do, fail to generate an 
associated rapid rate of employment expansion. The dualism concept holds that the formal 
sector, consisting of large-scale and capital-intensive economic units, is characterised by a 
limited range of technical substitutability of factors of production, while the informal sector, 
consisting of smaller-scale economic units employing much smaller quantities of capital, 
enjoys a much wider range of factor substitutability (Ishengoma and Kappel, 2006). 
 
In the informal sector, capital is, by definition, the relatively scarce factor. Thus, the amount 
of labour absorption in the formal sector is determined not by labour‟s own availability but 
by the availability of capital to this sector. Geithman and Landers (1973) further stated that 
the remaining supply of labour, which fails to find employment in the formal sector due to 
the occurrence of capital scarcity, is compelled to seek work in the labour-intensive informal 
sector. Labour forced to search for work in the informal sector can be absorbed there in two 
primary ways: either as “wage labour” or as “disguisedly unemployed” (Santana, 2002).  In 
the first case, labour can find employment as wage-earning agricultural labour; labour in 
construction, trade, handicraft manufacturing and personal services, so long as the value of its 
marginal product exceeds its money wage. In the second case, labour is absorbed into 
informal sector employment as disguisedly unemployed primarily in connection with family-
operated peasant farms and family-operated trade, services and small craft firms, and the like. 
 




The establishment and growth of the informal sector is related to a number of factors. With 
prevailing business/economic and rigid atmosphere in less-developed countries, the benefits 
of operating informally seem to be much higher than the cost of operating formally 
(Ishengoma and Kappel, 2006). This is based on the premise that even the SMMEs with a 
higher degree of formality still face the similar obstacles as those with a higher-level of 
informality. Therefore, SMMEs are discouraged from growing and increasing their degree of 
formality. According to Geithman and Landers (1973), survival informal sector businesses 
control employment in the informal sector and a larger number of employees rapidly growing 
informal sector are poor. Informal enterprises build excessive competition for formal 
businesses besides not paying taxes or social security contributions for workers or avoid other 
industry expenses acquired during business operation (ILO, 2002b). 
 
2.7 Todaro-Lewis Model Approach 
 
According to this school of thought, more formal sector employment and urbanisation results 
in more informal sector employment (Kucera, 2008b). “For every one person who got hired 
in the urban sector, more than one person migrated from the rural sector.” (Nolen, 2007) Lack 
of work in the rural areas and the perception of better opportunities in towns (urban areas) 
were major causes of migration. However, employment in the formal sector failed to keep 
pace with urban labour force growth; the process of urbanisation has elevated the concern 
over urban employment, underemployment and unemployment. Galli and Kucera (2004) 
further said that, “though a large number of industrial jobs were created in cities; these were 
insufficient to provide formal employment for all migrants.” Many who comprise additions to 
the urban labour force seek refuge in the informal sector in which they create their own 
employment to the extent that the capital and skills at their disposal would permit 
(Sethuraman, 1981). It is this labour surplus that contributes to the rise of informal sector 




employment; that is, immigrants enter the labour market and suddenly increase the number of 
workers available. 
 
2.7.1 Rural-Urban Migration 
 
The rural-urban migration is chiefly driven by the decrease in production of the agricultural 
sector and increasing demand for labour required by an expanding industrial sector (Srinivas, 
2009). The Todaro model throws some light on this: the rural population migrate to the cities 
on the expectation of a job, and because the formal sector is not big enough to absorb all 
labourers – the urban informal sector has helped to „absorb‟ these excess labourers (Basu, 
2000). Nolen (2007) further said that creation of one job in the formal sector has been able to 
generate employment for excess labour supply by using labour-intensive technologies. People 
move into urban areas to look for economic opportunities. In remote areas, often on small 
family farms, it is not easy to improve an individual‟s standard of living beyond basic 
subsistence. People are absorbed into urban areas because they suppose that they will have 
better prospects. For several, life is improved, but a number of them end up in poverty. 
 
 
Rural migrants who have a high-level of productivity and who can adapt rapidly to conditions 
in the urban labour market can make a significant contribution to economic growth (Bromley, 
1979). However, rural migrants generally lack the skills that employers demand and find it 
difficult to adapt. As a result an increase in the size of the urban population requires public 
assistance and exacerbates inequality. There will be an excess supply of unskilled labour 
force at the going rate. According to Borjas (2006), incorporation of the „new‟ labour force 
into the economy will consequently almost surely engage short-run variations in wages and 
employment levels for various types of skilled labour. Informal sector employment in this 




regard has played a significant role in absorbing this excess labour force (Sethuraman, 1981).  
According to Bromley (1979), informal sector expansion is dependent on the growth of the 
formal sector and labour supply. This basically means that the size of informal sector 
employment will expand with the growth of formal sector employment because a 
complementary relationship prevails. 
 
Rural migrants differ in their skills endowment from those of formal sector workers, thus 
inducing a change in the overall (labour) composition of the urban economy. For instance, 
most rural migrants are less-skilled which creates imbalance between the supply of and 
demand for dissimilar labour skills at a prevailing wages and output levels (Dustmann, 
Frattini and Glitz, 2008). The empirical evidence shows that the migrants who moved to a 
city to look for work were generally successful in finding one. However, most jobs found 
were not in the formal sector employment and Andersen (2002) stated that, even though most 
jobs were in informal sector employment, they were reasonably well-paid relative to rural 
workers. It is a presumption that the process of development in a dual economy begins with 
the mobilisation of labour resources from the main remote (rural) areas to growing urban 
areas. However, Basu (2005) stated that this mobilisation seems inconsistent with the 
existence of unemployment in the urban sector. According to Nwaka (2005), the growth of 













2.8    Conclusion 
 
Table 4: Summary Findings of Each Theoretical Perspective 
 
Model Findings 
Dualist Approach i. The formal sector is dominated by the key industrial sector 
while the informal sector is largely a subsistence economy. 
ii. The dual labour market: formal and informal or primary 
and secondary. 
iii. Primary labour market offers high salaries and wages and 
better working conditions while the secondary labour 
market offers lower wages and insecure employment. 
 
Structuralist Approach i. Unemployment is mostly amongst the least skilled. 
ii. Unemployment and informal sector growth are positively 
correlated. 
iii. High wages in the formal sector and unemployment are 
positively correlated particularly amongst unskilled 
individuals. 
Legalist Approach i. Tax evasion is the main cause of informal enterprise 
operation. 
ii. Informal enterprises operate informally because the 
process of formalising is time-consuming and costly 
iii. Certain rules and regulations (e.g. labour laws) hamper the 
formal economy, and, therefore, private enterprises shift to 
the informal sector economy.  
Continuum Approach i. Characterised by „first‟ economy and „second‟ economy. 
ii. The linkage that exists between the formal and informal 
sector is through the support informal sector receives from 
the formal sector (i.e. deliveries, promotion materials, 
name on signboard, discount price and credit). 
iii. The existence of the informal sector enhances the 
profitability of the formal sector. For instance, if formal 
sector markets are potentially highly scattered, the 
informal sector acts as an intermediary, through which the 
formal sector can access such markets. 
Micro-Business Enterprises  
Approach 
 
i. The growth of SMMEs is slowed due to limited access to 
finance and lack of market access. 
ii. The (opportunity) cost of informality seems to be much 
lower than the cost of operating formally. 




i. There is a positive relationship between formal sector 
growth and rural-urban migration. 
ii. Migration causing labour surplus in the urban areas 
contributes to the growth of informal sector employment. 
iii. Informal sector expansion is dependent on the growth of 
the formal sector and labour supply. 
 
Source: Author‟s Compilation from Various Sources 
 




The response of the informal sector hinges on workers who often move into informal sector 
employment when employment in the formal sector failed to keep pace with the urban labour 
force growth; that is, labour surplus contributes to the rise of informal sector employment. 
However, the formal and the informal are often dynamically-linked: more formal sector 
employment and urbanisation results in more informal sector employment.  
 
Dual labour markets: informal and formal is explained by the the dualist, structuralist, 
legalist, continuum, Todaro-Lewis Model, and micro-business enterprises approaches as 
summarised in table 4.  The dualist approach explicitly explains the informal sector as a set of 
subsidiary activities that provide incomes for the deprived; those who are incapable (for 
various reason) of accessing employment in the formal sector (Reimer, 2003). The formal 
sector is deemed superior to the informal sector, and these two types of sectors result in 
economic dualism that comprises informal sector employment and formal sector 
employment. Segmentation in the employment market arises because of various job 
characteristics rather than differences in worker attributes, such as education and training 
(Saracoglu, 2005). 
 
The literature also showed that informal sector employment is related to several structural 
changes in the dominant economy such as new immigrant labour-market entrants to a pool of 
workers already swollen by technological changes. Although the formal economy may be 
more capital-intensive, the labour-intensive sector (informal sector) cannot cease to exist 
because labour is too flexible to adjust to new innovation that will cater for the growth in the 
formal sector. The following chapter attempts to survey the contemporary literature to 
establish the validity of the hypothesis that reduced formal sector employment and increased 
trade liberalisation lead to increased informal sector employment. 






ESTABLISHING A THEORETICAL LINK BETWEEN INFORMAL SECTOR 





3.1     Introduction 
 
Unemployment is one of the developmental problems that less-developed countries are faced 
with in the 21
st
 century. The workforce that is unable to source employment in the formal 
sector economy is likely to source an income from occupations in the informal sector. 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) assert that increased foreign competition in less-developed 
countries also contributes to growth of informal sector employment. However, not all 
unemployed workers are absorbed into informal sector employment. Large formal firms‟ 
decentralised production, through subcontracting to smaller firms, also results in a steep rise 
in open unemployment (Galli and Kucera, 2004).  
 
The theory of dualism postulates the existence of two separate labour markets (i.e. primary 
and secondary) with mobility within each market but no, or limited, mobility between the 
two. The structuralist and Todaro-Lewis theories explain the growth and development of 
informal sector employment as being related to several structural changes (such as 
liberalisation of the economy, privatisation etc.). This chapter attempts to survey the 
contemporary literature to establish the validity of the hypothesis that reduced formal sector 
employment and increased trade liberalisation lead to increased informal sector employment. 
 
                                                 
2
 The rationale for including “trade liberalisation” (in the form of a proxy variable such as exports) is that, 
according to the literature (see Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003), it affects both formal and informal sector 
employment. Consequently, trade liberalisation is likely to impact the relationship between formal and informal 
sector employment. 




3.2    A Review of Selected Contemporary Literature 
 
3.2.1     Formal Sector (Un)employment 
 
Loss of employment in the formal sector (and resultant increase in formal sector 
unemployment), were considered to be the most important causes of informal sector 
employment growth (Pradhan and Van Soest, 1995). As the number of more skilled workers 
in the formal sector increase, some firms switch to „skill-biased‟ technology, and employ 
only skilled workers, increasing the skill premium. This skill biased technology has left much 
unskilled labour force with no job as a result of retrenchment from the formal sector. Unlike 
formal sector employment, the growth of informal sector employment is largely due to 
productivity not being dependent on a match between jobs and skills available. 
 
The analysis by education status advocates that people with no basic education are the ones 
affected by unemployment (Chandra and Nganou, 2001). However, many skilled workers 
were pushed into taking relatively inferior jobs in the informal sector. Pradhan and Van Soest 
(1995) further stated that the informal sector is viewed as an intermediary sector between not 
working (being unemployed) and the formal sector. Informal sector employment acts as an 
economic shield while a person is unemployed or such person may earn supplementary 
wages in the informal sector.  
 
From the traditional performance hypothesis stated by Field (1975, cited by, Pradhan and 
Van Soest, 1995), formal sector employment is rational, and all informal sector workers 
would be better-off in formal sector jobs. However, recent empirical evidence showed that 
many informal sector workers favoured their current status versus formal sector employment 
(see Saibal and Marjit, 2008). Kucera and Roncolato (2008a: 2) also supported this statement 




by saying “it is unremarkable that some workers would prefer informal work, and that is, 
what is meant by voluntary informal employment.” Participation in the informal sector comes 
from a variety of reasons. People may counter a lack of economic prospects in the formal 
sector by finding or securing informal sector employment or by joining subsistence-type 
informal employment (Saibal and Marjit, 2008).  
 
Informal sector employment in many developing countries, notably in Africa, is performing 
an important role in the formation of human capital, by providing access to training, and at a 
cost substantially lower than that provided by the formal training institutions. Although 
informal sector employment seems to have emerged as a major source of employment for 
those unemployed in the formal sector, Jha (2009) argues that it is not clear under what 
conditions labour is being absorbed into the informal sector.  
 
Antoine (2004) established two important points regarding the relationship between formal 
sector employment and informal sector employment. Firstly, the wage differential between 
the (rural) agricultural and (urban) industrial or (urban) government sector, causes workers to 
move to the city, in the hope of finding formal sector employment, however, inevitably have 
no option but to undertake jobs in the informal sector. Secondly, the vast majority of the 
informal sector is located within urban centres or major cities, and the migration to the cities 
generates excess labour supply in a given economy, which leaves the majority of people with 
no jobs. The reason being the labour market is unable to absorb all the available labourers 
into employment. The labour market is frictional in the sense that not every unemployed 
person is guaranteed a job in the formal sector, hence, they alternatively enter informal sector 
employment. 
 




In Kenya, Antoine (2004) found that government planned to deal with unemployment within 
the country by enhancing competence of the informal sector to absorb workers. Importantly, 
Duncan (1992) stated that formal and informal employment are gross substitutes for one 
another, that is, when people lose jobs in the formal sector economy, they turn to informal 
jobs to make ends meet. Antoine (2004: 23) thus said: 
 
“As far as the impact on the informal sector of these processes is concerned, it seems 
clear there are very important positive relationships between segments of the modern 
industrial sector and micro-enterprises. This is particularly evident in the metal-
working sector. And it is likely, therefore, that any major closure or reduction in the 
capacity of the modern sector would have direct knock-on effects on the informal 
sector, such is the latter‟s dependence on both new and scrap materials from the 
former.” 
 
A number of African countries have shown that there has been a downturn or stagnation in 
formal sector employment, while the informal sector has been increasing in terms of both its 
share of output and employment (Xaba et al., 2002). However, an increase in formal sector 
employment does not necessarily lead to a decrease in unemployment of the same magnitude 
– Walterskirchen (1999: 6) supports this by stating that in Australia, “out of three additional 
jobs only one has been occupied by an unemployed person, the remainder by persons from 
outside the labour market: hidden domestic labour reserves and in particular additional 
foreign workers.” Additional formal sector jobs will be taken in part by registered 
unemployed, and in part by the informally employed labour force (Walterskirchen, 1999).  
 
 




Shi (1999: 1) stated that “matching rates and wages are different between skills in the same 
industry, implying skill premium, and different between industries for the same skill, 
implying a within-skill wage differential.” A skilled labour force is preferred by high-
technology firms for their higher efficiency. According to Antoine (2004), informal sector 
employment grows faster than formal sector employment, because low-technology industries 
(informal sector) expand faster than the high-technology industries (formal sector) as a result 
of a lower fixed (capital) cost.  
 
 Partridge and Rickman (1997) stated that the Harris and Todaro model give an explanation 
of why the rural-urban migration could create a shortage of available urban jobs, resulting in 
open urban unemployment.  Antoine (2004: 15) found that, “as a result of the higher wages in 
the industrial and government sectors, workers migrate from the rural areas to the urban 
areas. The incentive for these workers to move to urban areas is still there even in the absence 
of the jobs within the cities.” From the Harris-Todaro model of rural-urban migration, it is 
evident that with the (urban) formal sector wage set significantly above the rural agricultural 
wage, and with the decision to migrate based largely on perceived (higher) earnings in the 
urban sector, migration to the urban areas is a rational decision although this might mean the 
likelihood of being unemployed, hence an increase in informal sector employment (Shi, 
1999).  
 
The Harris-Todaro model implies that as migrants go into the cities searching for formal 
sector employment, the bulk of people find themselves in a state of joblessness. In order to 
survive within these cities, some will endeavour to take on business-related activities 
becoming workers in the informal sector (Antoine, 2004). According to Srinivas (2008), the 




urban informal sector has soaked-up migrants with modest or no expertise, educating them in 
diverse informal skill that can be utilised in their own development. 
 
Due to population growth and rural migration to the cities, the economically active 
population grow at a much faster rate than the accessibility of jobs in the formal sector. 
Hence, there is a negative correlation between formal sector employment and informal sector 
employment (Walterskirchen, 1999). But formal sector employment, of course, will increase 
simply if economic growth rate exceed productivity gain (Walterskirchen, 1999). It is noted 
that the formal sector, recognising the constraints within which the informal sector operates, 
often tends to exploit the latter by imposing a dominant – subordinate relationship. According 
to Jha (2009), the formal sector is hypothesised to appropriate a part of the surplus generated 
in the informal sector. In other words, a significant part of the vitality of the informal sector, 
and its ability to generate surplus growth, is attributed to the presence of the formal sector. 
 
The matter of formal sector employment is an important aspect in the developed world, and it 
must be considered as being of crucial significance in developing economies. Structural 
unemployment arises when the economy fails to create employment for the total labour force 
even at times of robust growth during the business cycle. According to Mafiri (2002), the 
major proportion of unemployment in African countries is structural
3
. This is caused by 
change in the composition of labour supply and demand. As people struggle to get 
employment in the formal sector of the economy, they are eventually pushed into informal 
sector employment. 
 
                                                 
3
 A key component of „structural‟ unemployment is a lack of relevant skills or a mismatch between the skills 
supplied versus skilled demanded. 




Although there is evidence of significant wage dispersion, there appears to be a significant 
overall surplus of labour, particularly at the lower end of the wage spectrum. According to 
Mafiri (2002), the labour surplus has had a substantial effect on the nature of labour force in 
African countries. Informal sector employment was originally treated as a residual emanating 
from the inadequate absorptive power of the formal economy. It has been emphasised in the 
literature that productivity growth in formal sector employment acts as a “pull” factor for 
drawing informal sector workers and enterprises towards it (CUTS CITEE, 2009). 
 
3.3.2 Slower Economic Growth 
 
Some theorists believe that the informal sector can be better understood by considering 
activities outside the mainstream economy. Given that the informal economy consists of both 
self-employment and wage employment, Pianta and Vivarelli (2000) found that, more often 
than not, the informal sector self-employment provides a supplementary income to people‟s 
primary employment income. This often involves switching between the formal and informal 
sectors during the same workday. Participation in the informal economy arguably results 
from people who lack opportunities in the formal sector, thereby creating new activities in the 
informal sector, or by joining existing informal businesses (Pradhan and Van Soest, 1995).  
 
Growth of informal sector employment is attributed to economic restructuring and economic 
crises. One possible reason for slow economic growth in Africa over the last couple of 
decades is as result of structural changes. For example, the structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) of the 1980s and 1990s are said to have amplified informal sector employment owing 
to cutbacks of formal sector workers and allied liberalisation strategies (Ulyssea, 2006). 
Informal work arrangements may also be a strategy imposed by the process of economic 
restructuring brought about by the advent of sub-contracting. Workers are „pushed‟ out of the 




formal sector likely due to more favourable sub-contracting terms-of-trade or potential cost-
saving advantages afforded to firms by the sub-contracting relationship, thus leading to a rise 
in informal employment (Pradhan and Van Soest, 1995). 
 
Several research studies demonstrate that South Africa‟s economic performance was 
motivated by a strong and convincing dedication to a macroeconomic policy supported by 
tight monetary and fiscal policies accepted by worldwide markets. Yet in spite of the 
common approval from international markets preserving fiscal and financial solidity, an 
important, and subsequent surge in private investment, did not occur. Chandra and Nganou 
(2001: 4) said: 
 
“GDP growth rates peaked only once at 4 percent and averaged less than 2 percent for 
the decade. The weak performance of the real sectors surfaced in high unemployment 
rates reaching 37 percent in the 1990s and persistent job losses in non-agriculture 
employment measuring 14 percent between 1990 and 1998.”  
 
One of the most significant reasons for the slow economic growth of the last decade can be 
seen in the structural change with regard to the interest-growth-differential. According to 
Pianta and Vivarelli (2000), a key condition to stabilise formal sector employment in African 
countries is high sustained GDP growth followed by correct industrialisation tactics. A shift 
from formal to informal employment is generally as a result of decreasing GDP growth rates, 
and is accompanied by lower income per capita; an enormous increase in the size of the 
services sector, and a very modest increase in industrial sector employment (Pianta and 
Vivarelli, 2000). Melvyn and Syrett (2006) found that elastic labour markets in many of the 
affected countries permitted the affected workforce to be reallocated from the formal sector 
to the informal sector, thus alleviate the blow of the economic downturn. 




Sustained economic growth is expected to expand formal sector employment, but shrink 
informal sector employment. According to CUTS CITEE (2009), developing countries, 
Africa in particular, could experience a growth in their respective informal sectors under the 
following circumstances: low or slow economic growth which is capital-intensive in nature 
(i.e. jobless growth); or capital-intensive growth which brings about a rise in the demand for 
skilled labour in the services and manufacturing sectors. 
 
Pianta and Vivarelli (2000) stated that the economies are unable to soak-up all existing 
workers or addition to the labour force. Hence, it was found that informal sector employment 
exists to attract some of the labour force due to slow economic growth. Mafiri (2002) found 
that rather than the South Africa economy experiencing formal sector employment growth, 
not only did the unemployment rate was increasing, on one hand, while on the other hand,  
number of new jobs created in the economy actually went down extensively.  
 
Walterskirchen (1999: 2) explained that “the simple-minded argument that there cannot be a 
negative relation between economic growth and unemployment, because both are rising in 
the long run, is of course completely wrong,” the rationale being, there is a strong negative 
relationship connecting real output growth and the change in the unemployment rate in time-
series and in cross-country analysis (Pianta and Vivarelli, 2000).  In his empirical study, 
Walterskirchen (1999) found that an increase in productivity of one percent leads to an 
increase in employment of half a percentage point. This means that the higher the positive 
(labour) productivity effects of growth, the easier it will be to keep unemployment from 
rising. Calmfors and Holmlund (2000) found that more often than not, it is taken for granted 
that a rapid rate of economic growth also implies lower unemployment. 
 




Ranis and Stewart (1999, cited by Ishengoma and Kappel, 2006) explained that when 
economic growth of a country slow down, formal sector firms are likely to lay-off employees 
in order to reduce their operating costs. Tokman (2001) further stated that retrenched workers 
then look for alternative sources of income, which predominantly turn out to be informal 
employment. Ishengoma and Kappel (2006: 10) said, “the expansion of the IS and the 
deteriorating employment situation in many developing countries in SSA, Latin America and 
Caribbean are associated with low GDP growth rate.” However, economic development of a 
country does not automatically lead to the movement of workers from informal sector 
employment to formal sector employment (Ishengoma and Kappel, 2006). According to 
Becker (2004), economic growth may negatively shape the extent of informal sector 
employment only if growth is “pro-poor”, meaning if growth comes with increased formal 
sector employment and income distribution.  
 
The literature generally advocates that a negative economic growth rate may raise 
unemployment, hence increase informal sector employment. People who are laid-off during 
economic downturn, fit into place in the informal sector employment (Fox, Betchrman, 
Chandra, Eifert and Adams, 2009). Sluggish economic growth and low investment has 
resulted in a slow rate of new formal sector job creation. As a result unemployed labour force 
enters informal sector employment for survival (Becker, 2004). The need for suitable 
structures that would aid the absorption of workers into formal sector is important; new jobs 
in recent years in many of the developing countries have emerged in the informal sector. 
 
Becker (2004) explained the growth or decline of informal sector employment as being 
fundamentally correlated with the growth or decline of the formal sector employment. Some 
studies (see ILO, 2002a; Weeks, Tully, and Kimerling, 1975; Pratap and Quintin, 2006) 




showed that informal sector employment has in effect declined during point of economic 
growth and increased during point of economic recession (Misati, 2007). Among less-
developed countries (LDCs) rapid economic growth can, and frequently does, fail to create a 
commensurate rapid rate of formal employment expansion (Calmfors and Holmlund, 2000). 
It appears as if economic growth is not followed by growth in formal sector employment 
levels and income distribution, the informal sector employment does not reduce in size (Fox 
et al., 2009). The situation is, therefore, that informal sector employment is continuously 
increasing in most developing countries, and African countries, in particular, have exhibited 
this growth of informal sector employment (Becker, 2004). 
 
Actual development in the high-productivity, capital-intensive modern sector, that is formal 
sector, has not induced sizeable increases in employment. Calmfors and Holmlund (2000) 
reasoned that productivity growth has led to real wage increases, but there will be no long-run 
effect on the unemployment rate. Osmani (2006) stated that the reaction of employment 
growth to GDP has not declined in developed countries as a whole. However, in African 
faster economic growth has not for all time been converted into better employment prospects. 
 
The large majority of Africans are not self-sufficient, and rely solely on being employed for 
their key source of income. Therefore, failure to creating employment in the formal sector 
can lead to marginalised workers joining the informal sector for survival. Osmani (2006) 
found that economic growth is not the sole source of employment prospects. According to 
Macias and Massa (2009), the labour force participation rate is generally high in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and yet large numbers of employed people cannot lift their families out of poverty. 
Heintz and Pollin (2008) justified the extent of informal sector employment in Africa by 
saying in Kenya, Ghana, and Mali, informal employment is the dominant form of 








Increased globalisation throughout the 1990s – and the emergence of growing competition in 
global markets – has led many developing countries to move towards increasingly capital-
intensive production and to reduce labour costs, which resulted in reduced employment in the 
formal sector (Verick, 2001). According to Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003: 3) trade reforms, 
“reduce labor costs by cutting worker benefits, replacing permanent workers with part-time 
labor, or subcontracting with establishments in the informal sector, including home-based and 
self-employed microentrepreneurs.” 
 
A clear paradox exists in that increased pressure to move towards economic liberalisation and 
globalised markets, instead of expanding formal sector employment opportunities, has in fact 
generated a massive flow of workers into informal sector employment (Pianta and Vivarelli, 
2000). Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) said that increased foreign competition in developing 
countries has lead to an expansion of the informal sector.  For this reason, since the 1970s, 
labour markets in African countries have been characterised by historically high 
unemployment rates (Ostry, 2005). A decline in tariffs reduces open unemployment through 
expansion of employment in the informal sector and an increase in informal sector wages. 
 
The informal sector in African countries largely comprises trade-related activities, with other 
services and light manufacturing contributing only a small percentage of the informal sector. 
Norman, Oviedo, and Serven (2005) stated that the lack of a suitable mechanism that would 
contribute to the incorporation of the labour force into the national economy has meant that a 
large number of new jobs in recent years in many of the developing countries have taken 




place in the informal sector. Slow economic growth and increased trade liberalisation have 
perpetuated the flow of unemployed labour from formal sector to the informal sector (Fox et 
al., 2009). 
 
Trade liberalisation has led to a rise in informality through trade reform, which exposed 
formal „establishments‟ to increased foreign competition. According to Stalling and Peres 
(2000, cited by Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003), trade reforms have led to a labour reallocation 
from the formal sector to the informal sector. Alternatively, formal sector businesses may 
counter intensive competition from abroad by retrenching workforce, and then these people 
consequently look for employment in the informal sector. However, there are mixed views 
concerning the relationship between trade liberalisation and the growth of informal sector 
employment.  
 
In their empirical study conducted in Brazil, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) found that there is 
hardly any evidence linking increased informal sector employment to trade, while on the 
other hand, Currie and Harrison (1997) stated that, in Morocco, firms started hiring more 
temporary workers after the roll-out of widespread trade liberalisation. Ongoing economic 
change has increased drastically the role played by the informal sector in shaping the pattern 
of employment in less-developed countries. The empirical study conducted by Tokman 
(2001), showed that in South Africa; many of the Latin American and other African 
countries, trade liberalisation during the 1990s was linked to decreasing employment, and, 
hence, economic uncertainty for the formal sector workforce. According to Saibal and Marjit 
(2008), reformatory policies caused the formal manufacturing sector to contract, and drove 
labour out into the informal sector of the labour market. 
 




Saibal and Marjit (2008) also stated that a combination of global under the conventional 
view, informal sector employment represents the inferior segment of a dual labour market, 
which expands counter-cyclically during times of economic downturn when workers are 
rationed out of the formal labour market. Fiess and Fugazza (2008) stated that trade 
liberalisation, if perceived as a force of greater competition for domestic producers, leads to a 
rise in informality, as firms shed formal workers to cut costs. Delicate competitive forces 
shape the formal sector economy by reducing; rationalising; sub-contracting; improving 
flexibility, short-term and part-time contract employment which, when combined with 
reduced community expenditure and wellbeing cuts, can contribute to the growth of the 
informal sector.  
 
According to Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), arrangements without minimum wages, assures 
work opportunities, and encourages informal business to switch from semi-permanent 
contracts with their workers to piecemeal casual arrangements. Trade liberalisation and 
investment patterns influence employment relationships and work arrangements. According 
to Ostry (2005), this impact can be seen when many informal sector workers have been 
proficient to locate new occupations or new markets for their goods despite the fact that 
others have lost jobs and markets. The growth of informal sector employment is largely 
attributed to not enough jobs being created for all those seeking work.  
 
Carr and Chen (2002) stated that “many frustrated formal job seekers find employment or 
create their own work in the informal economy.” High industrial development tends to 
generate more high-skill services sector jobs rather than low-skill occupations. In such 
context, individuals lacking skills to compete for high-technology formal sector jobs find 
employment or continue to be absorbed into the informal sector employment. Goldberg and 




Pavcnik (2003) also found that informal business and micro-business sectors are more 
vibrant, and generate more employment than the formal sector. Carr and Chen (2002) stated 
that during periods of economic change, whether due to economic reorganisation or 
economic crises informal sector employment tends to expand. The work force moves into 
informal sector employment when metropolitan firms close or the public sector contract. 
Saibal and Marjit (2008) also found that households should complement formal sector 
income with informal salaries in response to inflation or cutbacks in public services.  
 
Global trade and investment patterns have increased global competitiveness; investors are 
reallocating resources to nations that have low labour costs or shifting to informal 
employment arrangements (Carr and Chen, 2002).  A direct result of trade liberalisation is an 
increase in the size of the informal sector. Formal sector firms respond to global competition 
by retrenching workers who subsequently seek employment in the informal sector (Antoine, 
2004). Informal sector employment is important in African countries, and is often an entry 
point for broadening participation in the private sector.  
 
Economic growth, with export-orientation which generates employment and income, fuels 
the domestic market, which in turn contributes to further growth in GDP and employment 
(Currie and Harrison, 1997). However, African countries have been more susceptible to 
international economic transformation, and have experienced a growing informalisation of 
the labour market (Habib-Mintz, 2009). According to Heintz and Pollin (2008), the 
limitations of the formal sector, and the rationing of formal sector employment, have 
stimulated innovation in informal sector employment. Soares (2005: 11) said:  
 




“Trade liberalisation can also affect the allocation of different type of workers 
between and within industries. In particular, Brazilian firms may have reacted to the 
trade liberalisation shock not only by substituting non-registered workers for 
registered workers, but also sub-contracting part of the tasks that they could have 
performed earlier in an attempt to reduce costs. 
 
It could be disputed that the informal sector can absorb workers banished from the formal 
sector, leading to downward pressure on wage in the informal sector. The amount of workers 
engaged in the informal sector in Brazil has increased over time, peaking in the 1990s 
(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003). It is this trend that has led some to think that deepened global 
competition could be contributing to the growth of informal sector employment. Heintz and 
Pollin (2008) showed that most of the increase in informal sector employment comes from 
movement of workers from formal to informal sectors employment within industries. 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) found that 88 percent of increase in the informal employment 
in developing countries comes from movement of workers from formal sector employment to 
informal sector employment.  
 
This preliminary evidence advocates that if trade liberalisation had any effect on the 
occurrence of informal sector employment, such consequences would have led to changes in 
formal and informal sector employment within industries. “For example, industries with a 
higher share of unskilled workers receive higher trade protection and unskilled workers are 
more likely to work in the informal sector, reliance on industry level data could potentially 
yield a spurious positive relationship between informality and trade policy.” (Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2003: 25) 
 
 




3.2.4   Labour Market Legislation 
 
Labour market regulation mainly affects the formal sector. Galli and Kucera (2004) theorised 
that higher labour standards – in particular liberty of organisation and collective bargaining 
rights – and higher wages, reduce formal sector employment, thereby contributing to the 
informalisation of employment. According to Nickell (1997), it is not high wages per se that 
contributed to the increase in informal employment, but rather high wages paid to an 
immobile labour force. A rapid introduction of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights might lead to informal employment. Galli and Kucera (2004: 811) explain 
channels of informal employment growth as: 
 
“A macroeconomic channel with stronger rights contributing to „economic and social 
disruption‟ and thus discouraging foreign and domestic investment and hindering 
economic development and leading to increased informality; secondly, a 
microeconomic channel with stronger rights leading to higher wages in the formal 
sector and thus reducing the demand for formal employment and leading to increased 
informality.” 
 
It is usually debated that employment legislation increases firms‟ labour costs, and adds to 
their administrative burdens. An increase in the minimum pay provokes companies to cut 
jobs as they are required to hike the wage. If the whole labour market is governed by the 
minimum wage legislation, this will result in higher unemployment (Lee and Saez, 2008). 
The response of employment in the formal sector to an increase in the minimum wage paid to 
labour, raises the average number of hours worked by full-time workers, but reduces the 
number of part-time workers in the formal sector, who then (possibly) move into the informal 
sector to find work (Gindling, Terrell, 2002).  




According to Koeniger and Prat (2007), low-skilled workers bear most of the adverse 
consequences of employment protection legislation, and tend to drive small firms out of the 
market. The end result is high unemployment rate in due course, and the economy is expected 
to experience informal sector growth. The inability of the formal sector to generate sufficient 
employment is a major structural problem in the Sub-Sahara African countries (Archibald, 
2002). Trade unions and wage-setting structures, in an attempt to raise the wages of members 
and reduce the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled, destroy jobs, and may reduce 
productive efficiency through restrictive practices. According to Nickell (1997), labour 
legislation could raise the cost of employing workers and/or raise the actual cost of adjusting 
levels of employment.  
 
It must nevertheless be borne in mind that change in production patterns and unionisation of 
the labour market have generated change in the amount and structure of labour required, and 
may be judged to have been of more significance than autonomous change in the supply of 
labour arising from labour force growth. The impact of labour legislation has obliged 
employers to cut back on production and employment, or alternatively, to invest in labour-
saving equipment – again with a reduction in formal sector employment (Burton, Benham, 
Vaughn and Flanagan, 1971).  Lindbeck and Snower (1988) further said that after wage 
negotiation have taken place, an unforeseen reduction in labour demand occurs, so that firms 
dismiss some of their workers. As a result, when people lose jobs, they normally are forced to 
immediately find employment in the informal sector of the economy. This wage increase 
through trade unions would mean that for any given future position of the labour demand 
curve, employment will be lower than it would have been in the absence of a wage increase 
(Burton et al., 1971). 
 




According to Ruffer and Knight (2007), trade unions help to perpetuate the initial rise in 
unemployment. Firms are sitting with the situation of reducing the size of their workforce 
through dismissal or failure to replace retired employees, and, as a result, unemployment 
rises. Sooner or later the economy experiences a growth in informal sector employment as a 
safety net. The structure of wage determination is a key factor affecting formal sector 
employment. Mazumdar (1989: 109) supported this view by stating that, “the increasing level 
of minimum wages has affected the rate of growth of employment in the formal sector.” In 
this regard, Ruffer and Knight (2007: 3) said, “the informal sector is a „residual sponge‟ 
which absorbs that part of the growing labor force that cannot be employed in the more 
productive and remunerative formal sector.” 
 
According to Gindling and Terrell (2002), the impact of a minimum wage tends to be 
negative with respect to formal sector employment and positive with respect to informal 
sector employment. This implies that the minimum wage leaves the formal sector firm with 
no option but to employ unskilled labour force. An empirical study conducted in Indonesia by 
Habib-Mintz (2009), found that increases in the minimum wage 1997-2002, had reduced 
formal wage employment and increased informal wage employment. The study further 
advocated that some formerly self-employed people may get attracted into informal sector 
employment following increases in minimum wages (Habib-Mintz, 2009).  The low-skilled 
workers face a higher unemployment risk than highly-skilled workers. 
 
The effects of minimum wages are evidenced by an increase in unemployment. Gindling and 
Terrell (2002: 4) support this statement by saying, “if the entire labor market is covered by 
minimum wage legislation, this will result in an increase in unemployment.” However, if 
only the formal sector labour market is covered, only retrenched employers will look for 




paying job in the informal sector. In terms of association between earnings and employment 
changes, this is consistent with the view that wages are fulfilling an allocative role, that is, 
that wage changes are operating to redistribute labour as a direct response to changes in the 
demand for labour. Burton et al. (1971) said it is also consistent with the view that when 
demand rises in the formal sector, employment will increase as a result of the newly available 
job vacancies, at the same time, conditions are created which encourage unions to demand, 
and employers to grant, above-average wage increases.  
 
Conventionally, restriction on hiring and firing, and other employment protection legislation, 
increases the cost of labour, and leads to reduced flexibility and higher unemployment 
(Archibald, 2002). It is argued that trade unions, in attempting to raise the wage of members, 
thereby, reducing the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers, destroy jobs and 
reduce productive efficiency through restrictive practices.  Employment legislation impacts 
the functioning of the labour market in a variety of ways. According to Burton et al. (1971), 
the rate at which people leave employment is slowed, to the particular detriment of less-
skilled and the long-term unemployed, as firms become more prudent and selective about 
hiring. However, the development of the informal sector was seen as a solution to African 
unemployment problems (Bromley, 1979). 
 
Lemos (2004: 2) found that the, “studies that estimate minimum wage effects across sectors 
report larger wage effects for the informal than for the formal sector, and mixed employment 
effect evidence, which was found to be negative in both sectors,” (Fajnzylber, 2001 cited by 
Lemos, 2004), and was also negative in the formal and positive in the informal sector 
(Carneiro, 2000 cited by Lemos, 2004). Habib-Mintz (2009) on the other hand found that 
minimum wage legislation consequently increases the amount of permanent workforce and 




reduce the number of contract workforce in the formal sector. With respect to the informal 
sector, a minimum wage in the formal sector has a negative impact on informal sector wages 
and a positive impact on informal sector employment. Gindling and Terrell (2002: 5) further 
said that, “the increase in employment in the informal sector occurred because of an increase 
in the number of part-time workers.” Therefore, the “response of employers in the formal 
private sector to raises in the minimum wage is to increase the number and hours worked of 
full-time workers by bringing in some part-time to full-time and laying-off some part-time 





Participation in the informal sector employment comes from a variety of reasons. These can 
be attributed to formal sector employment loss; economic restructuring; global markets and 
economic crisis. According to Saibal and Marjit (2008), people may counter a lack of 
economic prospects in the formal sector by finding or securing informal sector employment 
or by joining subsistence-type informal employment. Xaba et al., (2002) stated that a  number 
of African countries have shown that there has been a downturn or sluggish formal sector 
employment, whereas the informal sector has been increasing in terms of both its share of 
productivity and employment  
 
As people struggle to get employment in the formal sector of the economy, they are 
eventually pushed into informal sector employment. Structural unemployment arises when 
the economy fails to create employment for the total labour force even at times of robust 
growth during the business cycle. According to Mafiri (2002), the major proportion of 




unemployment in African countries is structural (see footnote 3). This is caused by a change 
in the composition of labour supply and demand.  
 
Becker (2004) explained the growth or decline of informal sector employment as being 
fundamentally correlated with the growth or decline of the formal sector employment. People 
who are laid-off during economic downturn, fit into place in the informal sector employment 
(Fox, et al., 2009). Under the conventional view, informal sector employment represents the 
inferior segment of a dual labour market, which expands counter-cyclically during times of 
economic downturn when workers are rationed out of the formal labour market. Fiess and 
Fugazza (2008) stated that trade liberalisation, if perceived as a force of greater competition 
for domestic producers, leads to a rise in informality, as firms shed formal workers to cut 
costs. The implication is that, higher (formal sector) unemployment, may lead to a higher 
share of informal employment. Informal sector employment remains to absorb part of the 
growing labour force that cannot be employed in the more productive and better-paying 
formal sector. A decline in tariffs reduces open unemployment through expansion of 




























Chapters two and three have established the theoretical linkages between informal sector 
employment, formal sector employment and exports (as a possible proxy for the „trade cycle‟ 
effect on informal sector employment). Theoretically, informal sector employment and 
formal sector employment are (plausibly) „substitute‟ activities in the labour market.  
However, there is mixed evidence to support/negate this hypothesis.  This chapter attempts to 
investigate whether these two variables do, indeed, share a negative relationship and the 
magnitude of such relationship across various African countries, with, and without, exports as 
an impacting variable (see Saibal and Marjit, 2008; Xaba et al., 2002 and Walterskirchen, 
1999). Further, the expectation is a positive relationship between informal sector employment 
and exports. Olofin and Folawewo (2009) stated that trade is expected to increase informal 
employment in terms of quality or quantity of job creation or a combination of both (see also 
Galli and Kucera, 2004). 
 
The incorporation of exports, instead of net exports, is worthwhile for two reasons. Firstly, 
few of the sample countries have positive net exports for the time period. Secondly, this study 
also attempts to investigate how informal sector employment in certain African countries 
adjusts to exports, and how exports influence the relationship between formal sector 
employment and informal sector employment. Although it is understood that formal sector 
employment and exports (as independent variables), generally-speaking, have a relationship, 
which violates an assumption of the classical linear regression model (CLRM), this study 




takes account of this fact by remedying for multicollinearity by using the method of ratio 
transformation. 
 
4.2 Model Specification 
 
4.2.1 Mathematical Model 
 
ittiti
fy 21 ,                              (i) 
This shows 
ti
y  as a function of χ1it and   χ2it 
 
4.2.2 Econometric Model 
 
The equation explaining the relationship between informal sector employment, formal sector 
employment and exports is expressed as follows: 
itittititi
InInIny 2211                                       (ii) 
 
Where yit is informal sector employment; αit is the intercept term; β1 and β2 are the slope 
coefficients of the explanatory variables - formal sector employment (χ1it) and exports (χ2it) 
respectively. The error term μit is introduced to account for all other factors that influence 
lnyit; t  is time, and i denotes the cross-section identifier.   
 
The intercept (αit) tells us that if there was no change in the explanatory variables (or the 
explanatory variables were jointly held constant at zero), then yit would be the value of the 
intercept. However, according to Gujarati (1992), the mechanical interpretation of the 
intercept may not have a concrete economic meaning. The slope coefficients reflect the 




relationship between yit and each χit, ceteris paribus. In (natural) log
4
 form, the slope 
coefficients show the percentage change in yit for a percentage change in each χit, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
The expectation is a negative relationship between informal sector employment and formal 
sector employment (as these activities are plausible substitutes), hence a negative sign for all 
the β1 coefficients, and a positive relationship between informal sector employment and 
exports (as exports plausibly stimulated both formal and informal sector employment), hence 
a positive sign for all the β2 coefficients.  
 
4.3 Panel Data Econometric Methodology 
 
Before discussing the estimated regression results pertaining to informal sector employment, 
formal sector employment and exports, a brief explanation of the econometric testing 
procedure is necessary. The econometric procedure will ostensibly make use of a fixed-
effects or least squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach. In the regression model, the first 
step will be to regress informal sector employment on formal sector employment. The second 
step will be to incorporate exports as a possible proxy for the „trade cycle‟ effect on informal 
sector employment. Adopting exports in the model will reveal how informal sector 
employment changes due to changes in formal sector employment only (step 1), and both 
formal sector employment and exports (step 2).  
 
                                                 
4
 This model formulation represents a double-log or constant elasticities model. Although other model 
formulations were tested, this model formulation revealed the most statistically „meaningful‟ relationship 
between the variables chosen for this study. In terms of estimated „one-to-one‟ or unit change relationships 
between informal and formal employment (i.e. a/unit increase in formal employment leads to a/unit decrease in 
informal employment), this would be best catered for in a level-form variable regression where the absolute 
values of each variable are used. 




4.3.2 All Coefficients Constant Across Time and Countries 
 
The first model estimated disregards the space and time dimensions of the pooled data, and 
estimates the „pooled‟ OLS regression (Gujarati, 2003). Thus, 11 observations for all 6 
sample countries are „stacked‟ on top of each other giving 66 observations for each variable 
in the model. The assumption is that the intercept and slope coefficients are all identical for 
the six countries. Equation (ii) is representative of this model. According to Gujarati (2003), 
the pooled regression may distort the „true‟ picture of the relationship between Y and the X‟s 
across the six countries. Therefore, the following model formulations (i.e. model iii, v, vi and 
vii) will undertake to take into account the specific nature of informal sector employment in 
the six countries. 
 
4.3.3 Slope Coefficients Constant but the Intercept Varies Across Countries 
 
Gujarati (2003: 642) states that, “one way to take into account the „individuality‟ of each 
country or each cross-section unit is to let the intercept vary for each country but still 
assuming that the slope coefficient is constant across countries.” The fixed effects model 
shown by equation (iii) allows the intercept to vary between countries by adding m-1 
differential intercept dummies to the model.  
 
itittiiiiiiti
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Where α1 = base or reference country which represents South Africa; D2i = 1 if the 
observation belongs to Kenya, 0 otherwise; D3i = 1 if the observation belongs to Namibia, 0 




otherwise; D4i = 1 if the observation belongs to Zambia, 0 otherwise; D5i = 1 if the 
observation belongs to Botswana, 0 otherwise; D6i = 1 if the observation belongs to 
Mauritius, 0 otherwise. Since we have 6 countries, only 5 dummies will be used to avoid 
falling into the dummy-variable trap (i.e. the situation of perfect collinearity which arises 
when using m dummies, and including an intercept term). South Africa is chosen as the 
comparison country, and α1 represents the South Africa intercept. Having used a restricted 
model (equation ii) and unrestricted model (equation iii), the restricted F test will be used to 
investigate whether the restricted R
2
r and unrestricted R
2
ur are the same statistically (i.e. the 
difference between the two R
2
 values is statistically insignificant). This will be performed 
using the F distribution resembling the structure of the F test for R
2 
change (Yaffee, 2005). 
The hypotheses are: 
 
H0 : αit = 0 (i.e. all intercepts are statistically the same, therefore, R
2 values are statistically the same.) 
H1 : αit ≠ 0 (i.e. all intercepts are not statistically the same, therefore, R




        (iv)
                                        
If F is statistically insignificant, this implies that there is no statistical difference between the 
restricted and unrestricted regressions. If F is statistically significant, this implies that there is 
a statistically significant improvement in R
2
 (i.e. there are statistically significant fixed effects 
explained by the unrestricted regression).  Just as the dummy variables have been used to 
account for the individual country (intercept) effects, time dummies can also be used to 
account for time-based effects (Gujarati, 2003). 
 





InInDDDy 221110210 08........0099ln      
                               (v) 
 
Equation (v) works the same way as equation (iii), except that time is now used instead of a 
country. The year 1998 will be treated as the base year, and its intercept will be λ0. 
 
4.3.4 Slope Coefficients Constant but the Intercept Varies Across Countries and Over 
Time 
 
The possibility is to combine equations (iii) and (v) as follows: 
 
iiiiiti
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            (vi) 
 
The overall effect that might emerge is that perhaps there will be pronounced individual 
country effects but no time effect (Gujarati, 2003). In other words, there may not be any 
statistically significant time effect for the sample of countries, but there may be statistically 
significant differences between the intercepts of each country, over the study period. 
 
4.3.4   All Coefficients Vary Across Countries 
 
Now the assumption is that the intercepts and slope coefficients are different for all countries. 
That is to say that informal sector employment is different for all countries. The estimated 
model would be: 
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                                                                                                                                               (vii) 
  
The γ‟s are the differential slope coefficients, just as α1, α2, α3, α4, α5 and α6 are differential 
intercept coefficients. Gujarati (2003: 645) stated that “ if one or more of the γ coefficients 
are statistically significant, it will tell us that one or more slope coefficients are different from 
the base group”.  But, if all the differential intercept coefficients and all the differential slope 
coefficients are statistically significant, we can conclude that informal sector employment in 
all the countries is statistically different from the base country (South Africa), in both 




Multicollinearity is a strong or perfect collinear relationship between some or all of the 
explanatory variables. According to Gujarati (2003: 359), if R
2 
is high and significant, but 
there are few significant t-statistics, this is a classic symptom of multicollinearity. Gujarati 
(2003: 366) states that, “one reason for high multicollinearity between variables is that over 
time both (explanatory) variables tend to move in the same direction.” In this study, it is 
likely that formal sector employment and exports tend to move in the same direction over 
time. Therefore, the likelihood of multicollinearity occurring is good.  
 
Koop (2009: 100) states that, “there is not much that can be done to correct this problem 
other than to drop out some of the highly correlated variables from the regression.”  
According to Graham (2003), a useful approach to solving the problems due to 
multicollinearity is to explore the functional nature of the collinearity between explanatory 




variables, rather than drop them. In time series data, formal sector employment and exports 
are likely to be highly collinear. According to Gujarati (2003: 363), multicollinearity is 
essentially a data deficiency problem, and sometimes we have no choice over the data we 
have available for empirical analysis. Thus, in this study, suitable transformed data is used as 
a remedy for (possible) multicollinearity. 
 
4.5 Empirical Results and Discussion of Findings 
 
 
Based on the econometric methodology and model specifications formulated in the preceding 
section, section 4.5 analyses the relationship between informal sector employment, formal 
sector employment and exports. All estimated regression models are labeled so as to accord 
with regression output given in Appendix C. 
 




Variables Coefficient  Standard error  t-values p-values 
Constant 0.754   1.030   0.732  0.467 




 =  0.700  R
2
A = 0.695   df =  64  Durbin- Watson =  0.535 F = 149.232 
Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment 














Variables Coefficient  Standard error  t-values p-values 
Constant 0.910   0.970   0.939  0.351   
InFE2i 1.078   0.091   11.876  0.000 




 =  0.739  R
2
A = 0.731   df =  63  Durbin- Watson =  0.612 F = 89.1500 
Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment 
          (1.2) 
   
The results are obtained from the pooled regression, and it can be seen that the coefficients 
are individually statistically significant. The estimated coefficients β2 (0.897) and (1.078) 
from equations (1.1) and (1.2) respectively,  show that as formal sector employment increases 
by 1 percent, the estimated increase in informal sector employment would be 0.897 percent 
and 1.079 percent respectively.  
 
The estimated coefficient β3 (-0.329) for exports shows that if exports increases by 1 percent 
informal sector employment will decrease by 0.329 percent, ceteris paribus. The negative 
sign for exports does make economic sense since we expect more jobs to be created in the 
formal sector when exports increases, and informally employed people will shift from 
informal sector employment to formal sector employment. 
 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model of trade hypothesised 
that trade impacts employment and wages, thus in labour abundant economies that use labour 
intensively, an increase in exports, in particular, lead to an increase in formal sector 
employment. However, Kucera (2008b) states that more formal sector employment and 
urbanisation results in more informal sector employment. Galli and Kucera (2004) also found 
that jobs created in cities are insufficient to provide formal employment for all migrants. This 




statement is justified by the coefficient estimators (0.897) and (1.078) which are statistically 
significant as shown by 12.216 and 11.876 being greater than 1.671 respectively (at the 5 
percent level).  We, therefore, reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that informal sector 
employment is (possibly) positively related to formal sector employment and negatively 
related to exports. However, the signs of the (slope) coefficients are contrary to expectations. 
 
Both models (1.1) and (1.2) gave the R
2 
(0.700) and (0.739) that is higher than the Durbin-
Watson (0.535) and (0.612) respectively. This indicates that there is potential autocorrelation, 
and Gujarati (2003: 806) suggests very strong first-order autocorrelation.  
 
A low Durbin-Watson value could be due to specification errors (Gujarati, 2003). The 
Durbin-Watson d test is used to detect autocorrelation. As a rule of thumb, if d Durbin-
Watson is found to be around 2, one may assume that there is no first-order autocorrelation, 
either positive of negative (Gujarati, 2003: 469). For instance, the estimated models assume 
that the intercept value of South Africa, Kenya, Namibia, Zambia, Botswana and Mauritius 
are the same (Gujarati, 2003). In our regression models, the Durbin-Watsons d is equal to 
0.535 and 0.612 respectively. This shows that there is evidence of serial correlation (of the 
first order). The pooled regression models (1.1) and (1.2) may distort the „true‟ picture of the 
relationship between the Y’s and the X’s across the six countries. Therefore, the use of 
dummy variables will help to account for the specific nature of informal employment in each 














Variables Coefficient  Standard error  t-values p-values 
Constant 18.898   4.864   3.885  0.000  
D2i 0.535   0.467   1.1.46  0.256   
D3i                  -4.074   1.070             -3.806  0.000 
D4i                        -0.807   0.441             -1.830  0.072 
D5i                        -3.620   1.114             -3.248    0.002 
D6i                        -3.274    1.113              -2.942  0.005 





 =  0.951 R
2
A =  0.946     df =  59 Durbin- Watson =  1.505 F = 189.892 
 Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment 
                     (2.1) 
 
With Exports 
Variables Coefficient  Standard error  t-values p-values 
Constant 19.489   4.263   4.572  0.000 
D2i 1.269   0.443   2.869  0.006 
D3i                  -3.803   0.939             -4.048  0.000 
D4i                         0.192   0.449   0.428  0.671 
D5i                       -3.672   0.976             -3.762  0.000 
D6i                        -3.106   0.975             -3.185  0.002 
InFE2i             -0.593   0.273             -2.174  0.034 




 = 0.963  R
2
A =  0.958      df =  58 Durbin- Watson = 1.480  F = 214.876 
Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment 
               (2.2) 
 
 
Models (2.1) and (2.2) seem to be better than models (1.1) and (1.2) judging by the statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients. The R
2
 values have increased and the Durbin-
Watson d values are much higher, suggesting that models (1.1) and (1.2) were mis-specified. 
 




The intercepts in model 2.1 for South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, Botswana and Mauritius are 
statistically different from one another, however, Kenya is statistically the same as South 
Africa. The intercepts in model 2.2 for all countries except Zambia are statistically different.  
The difference in the intercepts may be due to unique features of each country; impact of 
structural adjustment; economic growth; unemployment rate etc. as supported by the 




value however should not be surprising as we have more variables in 
models (2.1) and (2.2). Equations (2.3) and (2.4) provide the formal test of the previous 
models. In relation to models (2.1) and (2.2), models (1.1) and (1.2) represent restricted 












 value is from (1.1) and (1.2) and the unrestricted R
2 
is from (2.1) and (2.2), 
and where the number of restrictions is 5, as models (1.1) and (1.2) assume that the intercepts 
of South Africa, Kenya, Namibia, Zambia, Botswana and Mauritius are statistically the same.  
Clearly, the F values of 60.445 and 70.227 respectively (for 5 numerator degrees of freedom, 




and 59 (2.3) and 58 (2.4) denominator degrees of freedom) are highly significant, and, 
therefore, the restricted regressions (1.1) and (1.2) seem to be invalid. These F values follow 
the F distribution with 5 and 59 and 58 degrees of freedom.  The significance of the F values 
suggests that the addition of dummies to the model significantly increases the explained sum 
of squares (ESS), and, hence, the R
2
 values.  The F-test procedure provides a formal method 
of deciding whether a variable should be added to a regression model (Gujarati, 2003). 
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that informal sector employment is 
largely structurally different across the six countries.  
 
Time Effect : Without Exports  
 
Variables Coefficient  Standard error  t-values p-values 
Constant  0.966   1.147    0.842  0.403  
D99 -0.337   0.525   -0.642  0.524   
D00 -0.437   0.525   -0.832  0.409  
D01 -0.134   0. 525   -0.256  0.799   
D02 -0.379   0. 525   -0.721  0.474 
D03 -0.471   0. 525   -0.897  0.374 
D04 -0.241   0. 525   -0.458  0.649  
D05 -0.347   0. 525   -0.661  0.511 
D06 -0.002    0. 525   -0.003  0.997  
D07  0.053   0. 525    0.102  0.919 
D08 -0.207   0. 525   -0.394  0.695 




 =  0.713  R
2
A = 0.655   df =  54  Durbin- Watson =  0.511 F = 12.201 
Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment      











Time Effect: With Exports 
 
Variables Coefficient  Standard error  t-values p-values 
Constant  1.120   1.041    1.076  0.287  
D99  -0.379   0.477   -0.796  0.429 
D00  -0.505   0.477   -1.058  0.295   
D01  -0.174   0.477   -0.365  0.717   
D02  -0.466   0.477   -0.977  0.333  
D03  -0.499   0.477   -1.047  0.300 
D04  -0.165   0.477   -0.347  0.730  
D05  -0.209   0.478   -0.438  0.663  
D06   0.246   0.482    0.511  0.611 
D07   0.344   0.483    0.711  0.480 
D08  -0.060   0.478   -0.126  0.900 
InFE2i   1.125   0.095    11.793 0.000 




 = 0.768  R
2
A = 0.716      df =53     Durbin- Watson = 0.614      F = 14.647   
Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment 
                               (2.6) 
 
 
As the regression results from models (2.5) and (2.6) show, now considering time-based 
effects, the intercept coefficients are statistically insignificant. This might suggest that there 


























Variables       Coefficient   Standard error           t-value         p-values 
Constant   20.295  4.759    4.264      0.000  
D2i    0.431   0.455    0.947      0.348 
D3i   -4.400   1.049   -4.193      0.000  
D4i   -0.965   0.431   -2.239      0.030  
D5i   -3.960   1.093   -3.623      0.001 
D6i   -3.613   1.091   -3.311      0.002 
D99  -0.108   0.194   -0.557      0.580 
D00  -0.105   0.195   -0.540      0.591 
D01   0.091   0.194    0.472      0.639 
D02  -0.002   0.196              -0.010      0.992 
D03  -0.058   0.197              -0.292      0.772 
D04     0.133   0.196    0.680      0.500      
D05   0.012   0.195    0.062      0.951 
D06   0.384   0.196    1.955      0.056 
D07   0.415   0.196    2.123      0.039 
D08   0.343   0.199    1.728      0.090 




 = 0.965  R
2
A = 0.954     df = 49 Durbin-Watson = 1.701 F= 84.753  
Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment 
                               (3.1) 
 
 
Regressions (3.1) and (3.2) suggest that all estimated country dummies are individually 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level except D2i (model 3.1) and D4i (model 3.2). This 
suggests that informal sector employment across countries is different from the benchmark 
country (South Africa). The overall conclusion that emerges is that perhaps there is 











Variables Coefficient  Standard  error           t-value     p-values 
Constant      19.624  4.722    4.155  0.000   
D2i       0.970  0.577    1.682  0.099 
D3i      -3.992  1.072   -3.723  0.001 
D4i      -0.239  0.647   -0.370  0.713  
D5i      -3.741  1.089   -3.434  0.001 
D6i      -3.259  1.104   -2.952  0.005 
D99     -0.111  0.191   -0.581  0.564 
D00     -0.094  0.192   -0.486  0.629 
D01      0.086  0.192    0.450  0.655 
D02      0.022  0.194    0.115  0.909 
D03     -0.073  0.195   -0.373  0.711 
D04      0.051  0.201    0.254  0.800 
D05     -0.111  0.210   -0.529  0.600   
D06      0.189  0.234    0.806  0.424 
D07      0.193  0.244    0.789  0.434 
D08      0.184  0.223    0.825  0.414 
InFE2i     -0.493  0.303   -1.625  0.111 




 = 0.967 R
2
A = 0.955     df = 48 Durbin-Watson = 1.566 F = 81.890  
Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment 
                                    (3.2) 
 





Variables      Coefficient Standard error      t-value p-values 
Constant  10.153   6.573    1.545    0.128 
D2i  12.398   9.502    1.305    0.197   
D3i  17.561   11.750   1.495    0.141   
InFE2i  0.269   0.405    0.666    0.508   
D2iInFE           -0.749   0.616   -1.217    0.229 
D3iInFE           -1.553   0.867   -1.792    0.078 
D4iInFE           -0.004   0.039   -0.114    0.910 
D5iInFE           -0.130   0.119   -1.091    0.280 






A = 0.947           df = 57      Durbin-Watson = 1.280  F = 146.127   
Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment 
                               (4.1) 
 






Variables     
D4i    
D5i       
D6i       






Variables     Coefficient   Standard error     t-value   p-values 
Constant  22.826     4.773   4.782      0.000 
D3i           -7.810     2.968  -2.632      0.011 
D4i            5.690     2.549   2.232      0.030 
D5i           -2.963     3.182  -0.931      0.356 
D6i            0.589     4.975   0.118      0.906 
InFE2i           -1.092     0.352  -3.100      0.003 
InEX3i            0.887     0.257   3.452      0.001 
D2iInFE            0.474     0.209   2.270      0.027 
D2iInEX           -0.662     0.366  -1.810      0.076 
D3iInEX            0.498     0.344   1.447      0.154 
D4iInEX           -0.640     0.265  -2.413      0.019 
D5iInEX           -0.172     0.360  -0.477      0.636 




= 0.973  R
2
A = 0.967        df = 53  Durbin-Watson = 1.638 F = 161.161 
Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment 





Variables     
D2i 
D3iInFE  
D4iInFE   
D5iInFE   
D6iInFE    
     
 
 




Models (4.1) and (4.2) revealed a strong multicollinearity in that a number of variables are 
excluded from the estimation of each model. Further, both models have high R
2
 values, high 
F values and few significant t-values 
 
4.6 Ratio Transformation as a Remedy for Multicollinearity  
 
According to Gujarati (2003), ratio transformation
5
 may reduce collinearity in the original 
variables. Informal sector employment and formal sector employment will be represented as 
a proportion of total population by dividing both informal and formal sector employment by 






















                     (viii) 
 
The above model is used to resolve the problem of excluded variables (due to strong 
collinearity between the explanatory variables) as per equations (4.1) and (4.2). 
Transformation of variables may break high collinearity between formal sector employment 
and exports because, over time, both variables tend to strongly correlated. Thus, since formal 
sector employment and exports grow over time, they are likely to be correlated. Gujarati 
(2003: 367) states that one solution to this problem is to express the model in ratio 
transformation form
6
, to reduce collinearity in the original variables. 
                                                 
5
 The transformation of informal and formal sector employment is to explore the contribution of each sector 
with respect to total population in each country over the study period.  
6
 The following model was tried: InIFit=αit + β2InFE2it + β3In (EX/GDP) + μit to remedy the problem of 
multicollinearity, however, model (viii) above represents the most statistically meaningful approach in the 
current context. Further, population was used, instead of economically active population (EAP) for each 
country, as reliable, complete data regarding the EAP for each country, was generally unavailable. 






Variables      Coefficient Standard error      t-value           p-values 
Constant  -2.049    0.994   -2.062   0.044  
D2i  -0.510    1.297   -0.394   0.695 
D3i  -5.439    1.731   -3.142   0.003 
D4i  -2.363    1.734   -1.363   0.179 
D5i   1.471    5.831    0.252   0.802 
D6i   1.374    3.271    0.420   0.676  
InNewFE2i   0.764    0.708    1.079   0.285 
D2i InNewFE2i  -1.049    0.780   -1.344   0.184 
D3i InNewFE2i  -3.235    1.063   -3.042   0.004 
D4i InNewFE2i  -2.466    1.269   -1.944   0.057 
D5i InNewFE2i   0.282    3.288    0.086   0.932 






A = 0.684 df = 54  Durbin-Watson = 1.457 F = 13.791 
   Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment                         
                      (5.1)          
 
According to model (5.1) excluding exports, only Namibia and Zambia have differential 
slope coefficients significant at 5 percent level. That level of informal employment as a 
proportion of population (or changes therein) not dependent on changes to formal 
employment as proportion of population (i.e. the intercept) are only statistically significant 






















Variables     Coefficient Standard error      t-value           p-values 
Constant           -5.943   3.587   -1.657   0.104  
D2i  0.814   4.159    0.196   0.846   
D3i           -13.967   4.205   -3.322   0.002 
D4i           -0.231   3.938   -0.059   0.954 
D5i  1.550   5.953    0.260   0.796  
D6i  10.312   5.138    2.007   0.050  
InNewFE2i             0.195   0.730    0.266   0.791 
InEX3i             0.291   0.262    1.109   0.273 
D2 InNewFE2i            -0.083   0.829   -0.100   0.921 
D2 InEX3i             0.162   0.442    0.367   0.715 
D3 InNewFE2i            -3.624   0.946   -3.832   0.000  
D3 InEX3i             1.154   0.346    3.339   0.002 
D4 InNewFE2i            -2.347   1.110   -2.114   0.040 
D4 InEX3i            -0.134   0.285   -0.469   0.641 
D5 InNewFE2i   0.558   2.472    0.226   0.822 
D5 InEX3i             0.118   0.352    0.335   0.739 
D6 InNewFE2i            -0.898   1.520   -0.591   0.558 






A = 0.830 df = 48  Durbin-Watson = 1.960 F = 19.646 
Dependent Variable: Informal Sector Employment                        
          (5.2) 
 
According to model (5.2) including exports, South Africa (10 percent level), Namibia and 
Mauritius have statistically significant intercept values. With respect to formal employment 
as a proportion of population, only Namibia and Zambia have statistically significant 
(differential) slope coefficients. With respect to exports, only Namibia and Mauritius have 













This chapter detailed the econometric analysis of the relationship between informal sector 
employment and formal sector employment. In addition, the incorporation of exports,  as a 
possible proxy for the trade cycle effect, was used to investigate the impact „trade‟ has on 
informal sector employment by measuring the magnitude of the relationship between 
informal sector and formal sector employment, in the presence of exports, over the study 
period (1998-2008).  
 
The expectation was a negative relationship between informal sector employment and formal 
sector employment (as these activities are plausibly substitute activities in the labour market), 
hence a negative sign for all the β1 coefficients, and a positive relationship between informal 
sector employment and exports (as exports plausibly stimulates both formal and informal 
sector employment), hence a positive sign for all the β2 coefficients.  
 
Using various fixed effects or LSDV panel data regression models, the following key 
findings were applicable (see models 5.1 and 5.2, in particular).  
With respect to the (differential) intercept coefficients: 
1) South Africa (10 percent level), Namibia and Mauritius had statistically significant levels 
(or average changes therein) of informal employment as a proportion of population not 
dependent on changes to formal employment as a proportion of population and exports. 
The intercept for Namibia was statistically less than South Africa, whereas the intercept 









With respect to the (differential) slope coefficients: 
 
2) In Namibia and Zambia, informal employment as a proportion of population was 
statistically related to formal employment as proportion of population, with negative sign 
(as hypothesised) and „elasticity‟ greater than 1. 
3) In Namibia and Mauritius, informal employment as a proportion of population was 
statistically related to exports. Namibia had a positive sign (as hypothesised), and 
„elasticity‟ barely in excess of 1. Mauritius, however, had a negative sign and „elasticity‟ 




























The objective of this study was to estimate the relationship between informal sector 
employment and formal sector employment in selected African countries. The study 
addresses the relationship between informal sector employment and formal sector 
employment, on the one hand, and informal sector employment, formal sector employment 
and exports, on the other hand. What has been lacking in the literature thus far is a study of 
the relationship between informal sector employment and formal sector employment with the 
inclusion of the export sector.  
 
The study explored this relationship using various panel data regression models, which used a 
fixed effects or least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach to estimation for the six 
selected African countries. Exports were incorporated as a possible proxy for the „trade cycle‟ 
effect on informal sector employment. The panel data approach consists of observations 
characterising both a cross-sectional dimension (i.e. between various countries), and a time 
series dimension (i.e. over time). 
 
5.2 Summary of Findings 
 
Various fixed effects or LSDV panel data regression models were estimated. Most 
noteworthy was how the inclusion of various dummy variables not only improves the 
predictive power of each successive model, but also how the suspected „true‟ relationship 
emerged throughout this process. Models (5.1) and (5.2) represent the most comprehensive 
results which incorporate ratio transformations to remedy for multicollinearity.  






Variables       Coefficient Standard error      t-value           p-values 
Constant  -2.049    0.994   -2.062   0.044  
D2i  -0.510    1.297   -0.394   0.695 
D3i  -5.439    1.731   -3.142   0.003 
D4i  -2.363    1.734   -1.363   0.179 
D5i   1.471    5.831    0.252   0.802 
D6i   1.374    3.271    0.420   0.676  
InNewFE2i   0.764    0.708    1.079   0.285 
D2i InNewFE2i  -1.049    0.780   -1.344   0.184 
D3i InNewFE2i  -3.235    1.063   -3.042   0.004 
D4i InNewFE2i  -2.466    1.269   -1.944   0.057 
D5i InNewFE2i   0.282    3.288    0.086   0.932 






A = 0.684 df = 54  Durbin-Watson = 1.457 F = 13.791 
                             
                      (5.1)          
With Exports 
 
Variables     Coefficient Standard error      t-value           p-values 
Constant           -5.943   3.587   -1.657   0.104  
D2i  0.814   4.159    0.196   0.846   
D3i           -13.967   4.205   -3.322   0.002 
D4i           -0.231   3.938   -0.059   0.954 
D5i  1.550   5.953    0.260   0.796  
D6i  10.312   5.138    2.007   0.050  
InNewFE2i             0.195   0.730    0.266   0.791 
InEX3i             0.291   0.262    1.109   0.273 
D2 InNewFE2i            -0.083   0.829   -0.100   0.921 
D2 InEX3i             0.162   0.442    0.367   0.715 
D3 InNewFE2i            -3.624   0.946   -3.832   0.000  
D3 InEX3i             1.154   0.346    3.339   0.002 
D4 InNewFE2i            -2.347   1.110   -2.114   0.040 
D4 InEX3i            -0.134   0.285   -0.469   0.641 
D5 InNewFE2i   0.558   2.472    0.226   0.822 
D5 InEX3i             0.118   0.352    0.335   0.739 
D6 InNewFE2i            -0.898   1.520   -0.591   0.558 






A = 0.830 df = 48  Durbin-Watson = 1.960 F = 19.646 
                                
          (5.2) 




The expectation was a negative relationship between informal sector employment and formal 
sector employment (as these activities are plausibly substitute activities in the labour market), 
hence a negative sign for all the β1 coefficients, and a positive relationship between informal 
sector employment and exports (as exports plausibly stimulates both formal and informal 
sector employment), hence a positive sign for all the β2 coefficients. 
 
The following summary findings were applicable for selected African countries, over the 
study period 1998-2008. Using various fixed effects or LSDV panel data regression models, 
the following key findings were applicable (see models 5.1 and 5.2, in particular). 
With respect to the (differential) intercept coefficients: 
1) South Africa (10 percent level), Namibia and Mauritius had statistically significant levels 
(or average changes therein) of informal employment as a proportion of population not 
dependent on changes to formal employment as a proportion of population and exports. 
The intercept for Namibia was statistically less than South Africa, whereas the intercept 
for Mauritius was statistically greater than South Africa. 
 
With respect to the (differential) slope coefficients: 
 
2) In Namibia and Zambia, informal employment as a proportion of population was 
statistically related to formal employment as proportion of population, with negative sign 
(as hypothesised), and „elasticity‟ greater than 1. 
3) In Namibia and Mauritius, informal employment as a proportion of population was 
statistically related to exports. Namibia had a positive sign (as hypothesised), and 
„elasticity‟ barely in excess of 1. Mauritius, however, had a negative sign and „elasticity‟ 
greater than 1. 
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Algeria 506,1 34,1 172,6 538,8 1580 731 18555 30399 
Benin 21,5 45,2 9,7 167,2 370 283 3192 6272 
Botswana 52,8 33,4 17,6 1102,2 3300 1835 882 1602 
Burkina Faso 21,7 38,4 8,3 80,6 210 148 5418 11274 
Cameroon 82,8 32,8 27,2 190,2 580 415 7921 14876 
Cote d‟lvoire 86,1 39,9 34,4 239,4 600 418 8773 16013 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep 996,6 35,1 349,8 523,0 1490 1126 38708 63976 
Ethiopia 63,3 40,3 25,5 40,3 100 77 33356 64,298 
Ghana 48,3 38,4 18,5 126,7 330 210 10778 19306 
Madagascar 38,0 39,6 15,1 99,0 250 216 8112 15523 
Malawi 16,6 40,3 6,7 68,5 170 135 5232 10311 
Mali 2,6 41,0 9,3 98,4 240 168 5407 10840 
Morocco 324,6 36,4 118,1 429,5 1180 728 17567 28705 
Mozambique 35,8 40,3 14,4 84,6 210 170 9346 17691 
Niger 18,1 41,9 7,6 75,4 180 142 5143 10832 
Nigeria 367,3 57,9 212,6 150,5 260 147 65863 126910 
Senegal 42,9 43,2 18,5 211,7 490 631 5067 9530 
South Africa 1226,4 28,4 348,3 857,7 3020 1871 26713 42801 
Tanzania 89,8 58,3 52,4 157,4 270 226 17714 33696 
Tunisia 185,7 38,4 71,3 806,4 2100 1231 6163 9564 
Uganda 61,6 43,1 26,5 129,3 300 243 10722 22210 
Zambia 27,9 48,9 13,6, 146,7 300 274 5097 10089 
Zimbabwe 71,4 59,4 42,4 273,2 460 357 6515 12627 
Average 192 42 70 287 782 500 14014 25624 
 
Source: Schneider, 2002 
 






Data on Selected African Countries: Annual Time Series for Informal Sector Employment, 





Sources: Index Mundi, 2008; the World Bank, 2009; Statistics South Africa, 2007; Statistics 




Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics of Kenya, 2004; Khan, 2009; Kilele, 2008; Index 







Employment Exports (Million $) Population 
1998 1429000 7961000 27650 43294000 
1999 1892000 8477000 28000 43943000 
2000 1802050 12238000 30800 44523000 
2001 1967000 11181000 32300 45032000 
2002 1780000 11296000 31800 45541000 
2003 1903000 11424000 36770 46768678 
2004 1946000 11643000 41970 46344136 
2005 2462000 12301000 50910 46344136 
2006 2379000 12800000 59150 47187637 
2007 2455000 13609000 76190 47997838 
2008 2758000 13712000 86120 48782756 
Kenya 






Employment Exports (Million $) Population 
1998 3354000 3107425 2156 28752000 
1999 3738000 2897825 2200 29410000 
2000 4151000 2664110 1700 30100000 
2001 4624000 2367145 1800 30865000 
2002 5086000 3521864 2100 31517000 
2003 5533000 3291956 2514 31639091 
2004 5971000 3094724 2589 33829590 
2005 6407000 2891524 3173 33829590 
2006 4300000 1858000 3614 34707817 
2007 7900000 1851000 4127 36913721 
2008 7500000 1881000 4958 37953840 











Employment Exports (Million $) Population 
1998 74767 299064 1375 1806000 
1999 41463 325783 1400 1853000 
2000 48618 369750 1400 1894000 
2001 164262 256204 1580 1930000 
2002 144490 268604 1210 1960000 
2003 76585 333200 1090 1987447 
2004 30481 385329 1256 2030692 
2005 110960 298900 2040 1957000 
2006 52560 374490 2321 2044147 
2007 248820 376200 2919 2055080 
2008 252126 380190 2791 2088669 
 
Sources: Humavindu, 2008; Index Mundi, 2008; the World Bank, 2009; Institute for Public 










Employment Exports (Million $) Population 
1998 1812287 1978882 900 10100000 
1999 1852014 2557544 900 10200000 
2000 1029600 2743107 928 10300000 
2001 1057514 2804712 876 10547000 
2002 1071727 2889004 709 10800000 
2003 1101600 2934399 1039 11058000 
2004 1152000 3058263 1548 11261795 
2005 1187922 3167792 1947 11561795 
2006 1180800 3148800 3928 11873000 
2007 1197360 3167792 4594 11524000 
2008 2494500 3242850 4818 11745000 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Zambia, 2009; Central Statistical Office, 2009; Index Mundi, 2008; 




















Employment Exports (Million $) Population 
1998 129486 248800 2250 1572000 
1999 108559 266700 2360 1623000 
2000 131786 270600 2600 1641000 
2001 122717 274600 2500 1660000 
2002 112817 285400 2400 1679000 
2003 167178 291000 2544 1673267 
2004 148197 297400 2940 1740115 
2005 177241 294900 3680 1740115 
2006 174053 298800 4836 1769833 
2007 182785 302000 5025 1815508 
2008 195892 306000 4904 1842323 
 
Sources: Bank of Botswana, 2008; Central Statistics Office, 2009; Central Statistics Office, 










Employment Exports (Million $) Population 
1998 217500 248000 1700 2329000 
1999 219229 260270 1700 2447000 
2000 223069 259014 1600 2508000 
2001 221862 267635 1600 2568000 
2002 207706 280727 1600 2630000 
2003 199469 293983 1965 2912584 
2004 181368 308875 2012 3089859 
2005 184503 320923 1949 3086859 
2006 225680 283360 2318 3177388 
2007 217525 299450 2231 3270065 
2008 192864 339808 2404 3364940 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Mauritius, 2009; Central Statistics Office, 2009; Central Statistics 
Office, 2005; Index Mundi, 2008; the World Bank, 2009; Nation Master, 2006 
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Regression Output 
         
   
Model 1.1 
   



















Change F Change df1 df2 
 
 
1 .837(a) 0.700 0.695 0.854739285 0.700 149.232 1 64 0.000 0.535 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnFE 
 
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIF 
 
             



















1 (Constant) 0.754 1.030   0.732 0.467 -1.303 2.812       
 
LnFE 0.897 0.073 0.837 12.216 0.000 0.750 1.044 0.837 0.837 0.837 
 
  







           






         
    
  Model 1.2         




                    
 
 




Std. Error of the 









Change F Change df1 df2   
 
 










           
             
             
 
Coefficients(a)                       
 




Coefficients t Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations 
 
    B 
Std. 




1 (Constant) 0.910 0.970   0.939 0.351 -1.027 2.848       
 
  LnFE 1.078 0.091 1.005 11.876 0.000 0.897 1.259 0.837 0.831 0.765 
 
















          






         
   
Model 2.1 
   




















Change F Change df1 df2 
 
 
1 .975(a) 0.951 0.946 0.360551710 0.951 189.892 6 59 0.000 1.505 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnFE, D2, D4, D3, D6, D5 
 
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIF 
 
             





          
 















1 (Constant) 18.898 4.864   3.885 0.000 9.164 28.632       
 
D2 0.535 0.467 0.130 1.146 0.256 -0.399 1.470 0.637 0.148 0.033 
 
D3 -4.074 1.070 -0.988 -3.806 0.000 -6.215 -1.932 -0.543 -0.444 -0.110 
 
D4 -0.807 0.441 -0.196 -1.830 0.072 -1.689 0.075 0.239 -0.232 -0.053 
 
D5 -3.620 1.114 -0.878 -3.248 0.002 -5.849 -1.390 -0.399 -0.389 -0.094 
 
D6 -3.274 1.113 -0.794 -2.942 0.005 -5.500 -1.047 -0.299 -0.358 -0.085 
 
LnFE -0.269 0.299 -0.251 -0.899 0.372 -0.868 0.330 0.837 -0.116 -0.026 
 
  









           






         
   
Model 2.2 
   



















Change F Change df1 df2 
 
 
1 .981(a) 0.963 0.958 0.315791557 0.963 214.876 7 58 0.000 1.480 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnEX, D5, D2, D6, D3, D4, LnFE 
 
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIF 
 
             
























1 (Constant) 19.489 4.263   4.572 0.000 10.957 28.022       
 
D2 1.269 0.443 0.308 2.869 0.006 0.384 2.155 0.637 0.353 0.073 
 
D3 -3.803 0.939 -0.923 -4.048 0.000 -5.684 -1.922 -0.543 -0.469 -0.102 
 
D4 0.192 0.449 0.047 0.428 0.671 -0.707 1.092 0.239 0.056 0.011 
 
D5 -3.672 0.976 -0.891 -3.762 0.000 -5.626 -1.718 -0.399 -0.443 -0.095 
 
D6 -3.106 0.975 -0.753 -3.185 0.002 -5.058 -1.154 -0.299 -0.386 -0.081 
 
LnFE -0.593 0.273 -0.553 -2.174 0.034 -1.138 -0.047 0.837 -0.275 -0.055 
 
LnEX 0.438 0.101 0.346 4.349 0.000 0.236 0.640 0.393 0.496 0.110 
 
  





           






         
   
Model 2.5 
   




















Change F Change df1 df2 
 
 
1 .844(a) 0.713 0.655 0.909780187 0.713 12.201 11 54 0.000 0.511 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnFE, D00, D08, D05, D07, D04, D02, D99, D06, D01, D03 
 
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIF 
 
             
     
 




















1 (Constant) 0.966 1.147   0.842 0.403 -1.334 3.266       
 
D99 -0.337 0.525 -0.063 -0.642 0.524 -1.390 0.716 -0.037 -0.087 -0.047 
 
D00 -0.437 0.525 -0.082 -0.832 0.409 -1.490 0.616 -0.043 -0.113 -0.061 
 
D01 -0.134 0.525 -0.025 -0.256 0.799 -1.187 0.919 0.004 -0.035 -0.019 
 
D02 -0.379 0.525 -0.071 -0.721 0.474 -1.432 0.675 -0.024 -0.098 -0.053 
 
D03 -0.471 0.525 -0.088 -0.897 0.374 -1.525 0.582 -0.038 -0.121 -0.065 
 
D04 -0.241 0.525 -0.045 -0.458 0.649 -1.294 0.813 0.004 -0.062 -0.033 
 
D05 -0.347 0.525 -0.065 -0.661 0.511 -1.400 0.706 -0.020 -0.090 -0.048 
 
D06 -0.002 0.525 0.000 -0.003 0.997 -1.055 1.051 0.055 0.000 0.000 
 
D07 0.053 0.525 0.010 0.102 0.919 -1.000 1.107 0.063 0.014 0.007 
 
D08 -0.207 0.525 -0.039 -0.394 0.695 -1.260 0.846 0.003 -0.054 -0.029 
 
LnFE 0.898 0.078 0.838 11.484 0.000 0.741 1.055 0.837 0.842 0.837 
             






         
   
Model 2.6 
   




















Change F Change df1 df2 
 
 
1 .877(a) 0.768 0.716 0.825205172 0.768 14.647 12 53 0.000 0.614 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnEX, D04, D03, D05, D08, D01, D99, D00, D06, D02, LnFE, D07 
 
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIF 
 





       




















1 (Constant) 1.120 1.041   1.076 0.287 -0.968 3.209       
 
D99 -0.379 0.477 -0.071 -0.796 0.429 -1.335 0.576 -0.037 -0.109 -0.053 
 
D00 -0.505 0.477 -0.094 -1.058 0.295 -1.461 0.452 -0.043 -0.144 -0.070 
 
D01 -0.174 0.477 -0.033 -0.365 0.717 -1.130 0.782 0.004 -0.050 -0.024 
 
D02 -0.466 0.477 -0.087 -0.977 0.333 -1.423 0.491 -0.024 -0.133 -0.065 
 
D03 -0.499 0.477 -0.093 -1.047 0.300 -1.455 0.457 -0.038 -0.142 -0.069 
 
D04 -0.165 0.477 -0.031 -0.347 0.730 -1.122 0.791 0.004 -0.048 -0.023 
 
D05 -0.209 0.478 -0.039 -0.438 0.663 -1.168 0.750 -0.020 -0.060 -0.029 
 
D06 0.246 0.482 0.046 0.511 0.611 -0.720 1.212 0.055 0.070 0.034 
 
D07 0.344 0.483 0.064 0.711 0.480 -0.626 1.313 0.063 0.097 0.047 
 
D08 -0.060 0.478 -0.011 -0.126 0.900 -1.020 0.899 0.003 -0.017 -0.008 





LnFE 1.125 0.095 1.049 11.793 0.000 0.934 1.316 0.837 0.851 0.780 
 





             
 
Regression Output 
         
   
Model 3.1 
   



















Change F Change df1 df2 
 
 
1 .982(a) 0.965 0.954 0.332976797 0.965 84.753 16 49 0.000 1.701 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnFE, D00, D08, D05, D07, D04, D02, D2, D99, D3, D01, D4, D06, D6, D03, D5 
 
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIF 
 
             



















1 (Constant) 20.295 4.759   4.264 0.000 10.731 29.859       
 
D2 0.431 0.455 0.105 0.947 0.348 -0.484 1.345 0.637 0.134 0.025 
 
D3 -4.400 1.049 -1.067 -4.193 0.000 -6.509 -2.291 -0.543 -0.514 -0.112 
 
D4 -0.965 0.431 -0.234 -2.239 0.030 -1.832 -0.099 0.239 -0.305 -0.060 
 
D5 -3.960 1.093 -0.960 -3.623 0.001 -6.156 -1.763 -0.399 -0.460 -0.097 
 
D6 -3.613 1.091 -0.876 -3.311 0.002 -5.806 -1.420 -0.299 -0.428 -0.088 
 
D99 -0.108 0.194 -0.020 -0.557 0.580 -0.497 0.282 -0.037 -0.079 -0.015 
 
D00 -0.105 0.195 -0.020 -0.540 0.591 -0.497 0.286 -0.043 -0.077 -0.014 
 
D01 0.091 0.194 0.017 0.472 0.639 -0.298 0.481 0.004 0.067 0.013 
 
D02 -0.002 0.196 0.000 -0.010 0.992 -0.396 0.392 -0.024 -0.001 0.000 





D03 -0.058 0.197 -0.011 -0.292 0.772 -0.455 0.339 -0.038 -0.042 -0.008 
 
D04 0.133 0.196 0.025 0.680 0.500 -0.260 0.527 0.004 0.097 0.018 
 
D05 0.012 0.195 0.002 0.062 0.951 -0.381 0.405 -0.020 0.009 0.002 
 
D06 0.384 0.196 0.072 1.955 0.056 -0.011 0.778 0.055 0.269 0.052 
 
D07 0.415 0.196 0.078 2.123 0.039 0.022 0.808 0.063 0.290 0.057 
 
D08 0.343 0.199 0.064 1.728 0.090 -0.056 0.743 0.003 0.240 0.046 
 





           
             
 
Regression Output 
         
   
Model 3.2 
   



















Change F Change df1 df2 
 
 
1 .983(a) 0.967 0.955 0.328895855 0.967 81.890 17 48 0.000 1.566 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnEX, D04, D5, D03, D05, D08, D01, D2, D99, D00, D6, D06, D02, D3, D07, D4, LnFE 
 
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIF 
 
             
             



















1 (Constant) 19.624 4.722   4.155 0.000 10.129 29.119       
 
D2 0.970 0.577 0.235 1.682 0.099 -0.190 2.131 0.637 0.236 0.044 
 
D3 -3.992 1.072 -0.968 -3.723 0.001 -6.147 -1.836 -0.543 -0.473 -0.098 
 
D4 -0.239 0.647 -0.058 -0.370 0.713 -1.540 1.061 0.239 -0.053 -0.010 





D5 -3.741 1.089 -0.907 -3.434 0.001 -5.931 -1.550 -0.399 -0.444 -0.090 
 
D6 -3.259 1.104 -0.790 -2.952 0.005 -5.478 -1.040 -0.299 -0.392 -0.078 
 
D99 -0.111 0.191 -0.021 -0.581 0.564 -0.496 0.274 -0.037 -0.084 -0.015 
 
D00 -0.094 0.192 -0.018 -0.486 0.629 -0.481 0.293 -0.043 -0.070 -0.013 
 
D01 0.086 0.192 0.016 0.450 0.655 -0.299 0.471 0.004 0.065 0.012 
 
D02 0.022 0.194 0.004 0.115 0.909 -0.368 0.413 -0.024 0.017 0.003 
 
D03 -0.073 0.195 -0.014 -0.373 0.711 -0.466 0.320 -0.038 -0.054 -0.010 
 
D04 0.051 0.201 0.010 0.254 0.800 -0.353 0.456 0.004 0.037 0.007 
 
D05 -0.111 0.210 -0.021 -0.529 0.600 -0.533 0.311 -0.020 -0.076 -0.014 
 
D06 0.189 0.234 0.035 0.806 0.424 -0.282 0.659 0.055 0.116 0.021 
 
D07 0.193 0.244 0.036 0.789 0.434 -0.298 0.683 0.063 0.113 0.021 
 
D08 0.184 0.223 0.034 0.825 0.414 -0.265 0.633 0.003 0.118 0.022 
 
LnFE -0.493 0.303 -0.460 -1.625 0.111 -1.103 0.117 0.837 -0.228 -0.043 
 
LnEX 0.271 0.182 0.214 1.491 0.142 -0.094 0.636 0.393 0.210 0.039 
 
a. Dependent Variable: InIF 
             
             
 
Regression Output 
         
   
Model 4.1 
   



















Change F Change df1 df2 
 
 
1 .976(a) 0.954 0.947 0.356460962 0.954 146.127 8 57 0.000 1.280 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), D6LnFE, D2LnFE, D3LnFE, D4LnFE, D5LnFE, LnFE, D2, D3 
 
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIF 
 
             






       






















1 (Constant) 10.153 6.573   1.545 0.128 -3.010 23.315       
 
D2 12.398 9.502 3.007 1.305 0.197 -6.630 31.425 0.637 0.170 0.037 
 
D3 17.561 11.750 4.260 1.495 0.141 -5.967 41.090 -0.543 0.194 0.043 
 
LnFE 0.269 0.405 0.251 0.666 0.508 -0.541 1.080 0.837 0.088 0.019 
 
D2LnFE -0.749 0.616 -2.686 -1.217 0.229 -1.983 0.484 0.636 -0.159 -0.035 
 
D3LnFE -1.553 0.867 -4.787 -1.792 0.078 -3.288 0.183 -0.544 -0.231 -0.051 
 
D4LnFE -0.004 0.039 -0.016 -0.114 0.910 -0.082 0.073 0.239 -0.015 -0.003 
 
D5LnFE -0.130 0.119 -0.397 -1.091 0.280 -0.369 0.109 -0.399 -0.143 -0.031 
 
D6LnFE -0.103 0.119 -0.314 -0.865 0.391 -0.341 0.135 -0.299 -0.114 -0.025 
 
a. Dependent Variable: InIF 
             
 
Excluded Variables(b) 
     





     
 
Tolerance 
     
 
1 D4 4.739(a) 1.385 0.171 0.182 0.000 
     
 
D5 -7.407(a) -1.327 0.190 -0.175 0.000 
     
 
D6 3.036(a) 0.767 0.446 0.102 0.000 
     
 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), D6LnFE, D2LnFE, D3LnFE, D4LnFE, D5LnFE, LnFE, D2, D3 
     
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIF 











           






         
   
Model 4.2 
   



















Change F Change df1 df2 
 
 
1 .987(a) 0.973 0.967 0.280006241 0.973 161.161 12 53 0.000 1.638 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), D6LnEX, D4LnEX, D3LnEX, D2LnEX, D5LnEX, LnEX, LnFE, D4, D3, D5, D2LnFE, D6 
 
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIF 
 
             
             



















1 (Constant) 22.826 4.773   4.782 0.000 13.253 32.400       
 
D3 -7.810 2.968 -1.895 -2.632 0.011 -13.763 -1.858 -0.543 -0.340 -0.059 
 
D4 5.690 2.549 1.380 2.232 0.030 0.577 10.803 0.239 0.293 0.050 
 
D5 -2.963 3.182 -0.719 -0.931 0.356 -9.345 3.419 -0.399 -0.127 -0.021 
 
D6 0.589 4.975 0.143 0.118 0.906 -9.390 10.568 -0.299 0.016 0.003 
 
LnFE -1.092 0.352 -1.019 -3.100 0.003 -1.799 -0.386 0.837 -0.392 -0.070 
 
LnEX 0.887 0.257 0.700 3.452 0.001 0.372 1.402 0.393 0.428 0.077 
 
D2LnFE 0.474 0.209 1.698 2.270 0.027 0.055 0.892 0.636 0.298 0.051 
 
D2LnEX -0.662 0.366 -1.268 -1.810 0.076 -1.396 0.071 0.639 -0.241 -0.041 
 
D3LnEX 0.498 0.344 0.896 1.447 0.154 -0.192 1.187 -0.537 0.195 0.032 
 
D4LnEX -0.640 0.265 -1.147 -2.413 0.019 -1.173 -0.108 0.240 -0.315 -0.054 
 
D5LnEX -0.172 0.360 -0.335 -0.477 0.636 -0.894 0.551 -0.397 -0.065 -0.011 
 
D6LnEX -0.549 0.611 -1.005 -0.898 0.373 -1.775 0.677 -0.299 -0.122 -0.020 
 
a. Dependent Variable: InIF 




             
 
Excluded Variables(b) 
     





     
 
Tolerance 
     
 
1 D2 -5.238(a) -2.035 0.047 -0.272 0.000 
     
 
D3LnFE -7.556(a) -3.467 0.001 -0.433 0.000 
     
 
D4LnFE -2.364(a) -0.740 0.463 -0.102 0.000 
     
 
D5LnFE 5.503(a) 0.865 0.391 0.119 0.000 
     
 
D6LnFE .608(a) 0.150 0.882 0.021 0.000 
     
 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), D6LnEX, D4LnEX, D3LnEX, D2LnEX, D5LnEX, LnEX, LnFE, D4, 
D3, D5, D2LnFE, D6 
     
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIF 
      
            
            
            
 
Regression Output 
         





        
 
 
         
 
 
          





















Change df1 df2 
 
1 .859(a) 0.737 0.684 0.3241732060 0.737 13.791 11 54 0.000 1.457 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), D6InFENew, D2InFENew, D3InFENew, D4InFENew, D5InFENew, InFENew, D2, D3, D4, D6, D5 
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIFNew 
            
















Interval for B 
  
 





1 (Constant) -2.049 0.994   -2.062 0.044 -4.041 -0.056 
  
 
D2 -0.510 1.297 -0.332 -0.394 0.695 -3.111 2.090 
  
 
D3 -5.439 1.731 -3.542 -3.142 0.003 -8.909 -1.969 
  
 
D4 -2.363 1.734 -1.539 -1.363 0.179 -5.840 1.114 
  
 
D5 1.471 5.831 0.958 0.252 0.802 -10.219 13.162 
  
 
D6 1.374 3.271 0.895 0.420 0.676 -5.185 7.933 
  
 
InFENew 0.764 0.708 0.611 1.079 0.285 -0.655 2.183 
  
 
D2InFENew -1.049 0.780 -1.739 -1.344 0.184 -2.613 0.515 
  
 
D3InFENew -3.235 1.063 -3.765 -3.042 0.004 -5.366 -1.103 
  
 
D4InFENew -2.466 1.269 -2.168 -1.944 0.057 -5.010 0.078 
  
 
D5InFENew 0.282 3.288 0.329 0.086 0.932 -6.310 6.874 
  
 
D6InFENew 0.082 1.533 0.122 0.053 0.958 -2.991 3.154 
  
 






          
            
 
Regression 
          
   
Model 5.2 
  





















Change df1 df2 
 
1 .935(a) 0.874 0.830 0.2378855988 0.874 19.646 17 48 0.000 1.960 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), D6LnEX, D2InFENew, LnEX, D5LnEX, D3LnEX, D4LnEX, InFENew, D4InFENew, D2, D3InFENew, D5InFENew, 
D4, D3, D2LnEX, D6InFENew, D6, D5 
 
b. Dependent Variable: InIFNew 




            












Interval for B 
  
 





1 (Constant) -5.943 3.587   -1.657 0.104 -13.156 1.269 
  
 
D2 0.814 4.159 0.530 0.196 0.846 -7.549 9.178 
  
 
D3 -13.967 4.205 -9.096 -3.322 0.002 -22.422 -5.513 
  
 
D4 -0.231 3.938 -0.150 -0.059 0.954 -8.149 7.688 
  
 
D5 1.550 5.953 1.009 0.260 0.796 -10.419 13.519 
  
 
D6 10.312 5.138 6.715 2.007 0.050 -0.018 20.643 
  
 
InFENew 0.195 0.730 0.156 0.266 0.791 -1.274 1.663 
  
 
LnEX 0.291 0.262 0.617 1.109 0.273 -0.237 0.819 
  
 
D2InFENew -0.083 0.829 -0.137 -0.100 0.921 -1.750 1.585 
  
 
D2LnEX 0.162 0.442 0.833 0.367 0.715 -0.726 1.050 
  
 
D3InFENew -3.624 0.946 -4.217 -3.832 0.000 -5.525 -1.722 
  
 
D3LnEX 1.154 0.346 5.579 3.339 0.002 0.459 1.848 
  
 
D4InFENew -2.347 1.110 -2.063 -2.114 0.040 -4.578 -0.115 
  
 
D4LnEX -0.134 0.285 -0.643 -0.469 0.641 -0.707 0.440 
  
 
D5InFENew 0.558 2.472 0.650 0.226 0.822 -4.413 5.529 
  
 
D5LnEX 0.118 0.352 0.619 0.335 0.739 -0.590 0.826 
  
 
D6InFENew -0.898 1.520 -1.340 -0.591 0.558 -3.954 2.159 
  
 
D6LnEX -1.430 0.701 -7.027 -2.039 0.047 -2.839 -0.020 
   
 
 
 
  
 
